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Abstract
This paper studies the deep and proximate determinants of the evolution of the cross-
country distribution of GDP per worker in the period 1960-2008 by a novel methodology
based on information criterion. We find that countries of our sample follow three dis-
tinctive growth regimes identified by two deep determinants, the life expectancy at birth
in 1960 and the share of Catholics in 1965, and that each regime is characterized by
nonlinearities. Growth regimes appear as the major cause of the increased inequality
and polarization, while technological catching-up, proxied by the initial level of GDP
per worker, acts in the opposite direction. Finally, human capital marginally reduces
polarization, while investment rates and employment growth has not any distributional
effect.
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1 Introduction
The literature on growth empirics has not reached a consensus on the determinants of world income
inequality (Johnson and Papageorgious, 2017). We believe that this failure is mainly due to the lack
of consideration of a hierarchy among the set of candidate determinants which was, on the contrary,
a key characteristic of the seminal paper by Durlauf and Johnson (1995). Therefore, in this paper we
propose a new methodology based on information criterion which allows to identify deep and proximate
determinants in the spirit of Rodrik (2003), and to deal with other critical issues discussed in the
literature such as model uncertainty, nonlinearities and endogeneity. We then apply this methodology
to the investigation of the determinants of inequality and polarization in the world distribution of
income, measured by GDP per worker, in the period 1960-2008.
The most significant stylized fact on the evolution of the cross-country income distribution is the
shift from unimodality in the 1960s to bimodality in the 1990s (see Durlauf et al., 2005, for exhaustive
discussion and references). Several, and potentially complementary, explanations have been advanced.
A first explanation relies on the assumption that different countries obey different growth processes,
i.e. they belong to different growth regimes according to their initial conditions proxied, for example,
by GDP per capita, human capital, or life expectancy (see, e.g., Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, Durlauf
et al., 2001, and Kourtellos, 2011). Another explanation is based on the effect of nonlinearities in the
growth process (see, e.g., Liu and Stengos, 1999), while a third one distinguishes deep (or fundamental)
from proximate growth determinants, assuming that the former determine the latter and, ultimately,
long-run outcomes (see Rodrik, 2003).1 The deep determinants proposed in the literature include:
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005); culture, in particular in the form of social capital (Knack and
Keefer, 1997, Temple and Johnson, 1998) and religion (Durlauf et al., 2012); geography (Bloom et al.,
2003); and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 1997, Tan, 2009). The proximate
determinants are those typically appearing in the production function, i.e. factors of production and
technology (see, e.g., Rodrik, 2003 and Weil, 2012). Embracing one or the other explanation implies
profoundly different growth-enhancing policies (Rodrik, 2003).
Our empirical strategy integrates the insights of these different lines of research. Specifically, our
methodology identifies growth regimes by a set of candidate deep determinants (we label “deep” de-
terminant any variable used to identify growth regimes), and simultaneously estimates a nonlinear
growth model within each growth regime, which includes the proximate determinants suggested by
Mankiw et al. (1992): initial income per worker (as a proxy for technological catching-up), investment
rate, employment growth and human capital.2 Applying this methodology to a sample of 84 coun-
1Weil (2012, p. 53) classifies growth determinants into “proximate” and “ultimate”.
2Brock (2001) proposes a taxonomy of growth determinants based on their time scales, where “deep” de-
terminants are moving on a slower time scale than “proximate” determinants, while Tan (2009) distinguishes
between “development clubs”, identified on the basis of the sole deep determinants, and “growth regimes”,
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tries over the period 1960-2008, we identify as relevant deep determinants initial health conditions,
proxied by life expectancy at birth in 1960 and culture, proxied by the share of Catholics in 1965. In
particular, we identify three regimes: “high life expectancy regime”, “low life expectancy/high share
of Catholics regime”, and “low life expectancy/low share of Catholics regime”. Furthermore, we show
that nonlinearities within the regimes are a pervasive phenomenon. By a counterfactual analysis we
demonstrate that growth regimes are the main source of polarization and inequality. Among the prox-
imate determinants, initial income has the opposite distributional effect, human capital marginally
reduces polarization, while the investment rate and the employment growth rate have no significant
effects.
Our results contrast with several existing findings, and contain some novelties. Contributions on
the relative importance of competing deep determinants of growth such as institutions and geography
conclude that institutions prevail (Rodrik et al., 2004, Tan, 2009, Owen et al., 2009 and Flachaire
et al., 2014). In the identification of growth regimes we consider the largest set of candidates with
respect to the existing literature, among which institutions and geography: the latter are however both
dominated by life expectancy at birth in 1960 and the share of Catholics in 1965. Our results therefore
confirm the importance of culture, as proxied by the share of Catholics in 1965, in development, as
thoroughly discussed in Guiso et al. (2006), but as regime identifier and not as a covariate in a growth
regression.3 Finally, with the partial exception of Kourtellos (2011), no previous work found life
expectancy as an identifier of growth regimes.4
We find significant nonlinearities within regimes, suggesting that previous works based on linear
specifications may suffer from misspecification bias. Moreover, proximate determinants are generally
significant in all regimes with an important difference: human capital has a positive effect on growth
only in the “low life expectancy/low share of Catholics” regime. This evidence can help to explain
why Durlauf et al. (2012) do not find any effect of human capital, given their choice to consider our
deep determinants as additional covariates in a regression, and to estimate linear models. We do not
find any significant distributional effect of cross-country heterogeneity in investment and employment
growth rates but, differently from Beaudry et al. (2005), a significant effect of the initial level of GDP
per worker.
Lastly, we contribute to the debate on whether: “the transition to the long-run steady-state [can
be] associated with non-monotonic evolution of the distribution of income across countries. Thus,
convergence may be preceded by polarization and clustering, and club convergence will be generated
by these models in the medium run” (Galor, 1996, p. 96). In particular, Lucas (2000) and Galor
(2007) claim that polarization is a transitory phenomenon caused by the different timing of countries’
identified by both the deep and proximate determinants.
3The role of religion as a covariate has been convincingly challenged by Durlauf et al. (2012).
4However, Kourtellos (2011) does not deal with the issue of model uncertainty.
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take-off. Lucas (2000) argues that countries randomly start their growth process and, subsequently,
adopt the technology of the leading countries. Differently, Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2007)
propose the Unified Growth Theory (UGT), according to which a country transits from a Malthusian
Regime to a Post-Malthusian Regime, and finally reaches the Modern Growth Regime. Although our
“high-life expectancy” regime has the characteristics of the Modern Growth Regime (but the other
two regimes differ from those hypothesized by the UGT), our counterfactual analysis suggests that
in the period 1960-2008 the predicted regime transitions did not take place for a relevant number
of countries. Thus our analysis suggests that “club convergence” is a persistent phenomenon. An
important (and obvious) caveat to this claim is that while Lucas (2000) and Galor (2007) consider a
very long-run horizon, our analysis is limited to 48 years (which is however a long period compared
to other studies on distribution dynamics).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature; Section 3 describes the
methodology; Section 4 presents the empirical analysis; Section 5 concludes. The appendices contain
some technical details on the methodology and on data.
2 Related Literature
The importance of classifying growth determinants into deep and proximate is discussed, among
others, by Rodrik (2003) and Weil (2012). An investigation of the impact of deep determinants for
long-term development is proposed by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), who also offer an exhaustive
review of the existing literature. The main thrust of the argument is that, while the proximate
determinants directly affect growth, they are themselves determined by other, deeper, determinants
such as geography, institutions and culture.5 Weil (2012) highlights the several links between deep and
proximate determinants. For example, geographic location can favor trade and technological spillovers;
institutions can encourage savings and the accumulation of factors; culture can imply openness or
closure to new ideas and technologies, a positive attitude towards hard work, favoring efficiency, or
to thriftiness favoring accumulation.6 Understanding economic growth and comparative development,
therefore, requires to identify the relevant deep determinants. The novelty of our approach is the joint
identification of the relevant deep determinants and of the growth models within each of the identified
growth regimes.
In the literature, different methods have been utilized to identify growth regimes. Durlauf and
Johnson (1995) and Tan (2009) use clustering algorithms (denoted by CART and GUIDE respectively)
5Among the deep determinants, Weil (2012) also considers inequality, while Rodrik (2003) includes trade
openness.
6For a detailed account see Weil (2012). Rodrik (2003) contains some remarks on the exogeneity, or (partial)
endogeneity, of the deep determinants and on their interrelations.
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that sequentially partition the countries into regimes on the basis of some deep determinants; Desdoigts
(1999) utilizes a projection pursuit approach based on proximate determinants, and indirectly identifies
the relevant deep determinants; Owen et al. (2009), Flachaire et al. (2014) and Anderson et al. (2016)
use finite mixture models, while Bos et al. (2010) split a sample of countries by a multinomial logit
model, and then estimate a stochastic frontier model within each growth regime. The main difference
with respect to these works is that we allow for nonlinearities within each regime and study the effect
of growth regimes on the evolution of the income distribution.7 Moreover, our procedure allows for
model selection under uncertainty that if “ignored, [would imply that] precision is often overestimated,
achieved confidence interval coverage is below the nominal level, and predictions are less accurate than
expected” (Burnham and Anderson, 2003).
Our work is also related to the studies on the determinants of distribution dynamics. Specifically,
Quah (1996) introduces the concept of conditioned stochastic kernel,8 based on residuals from a re-
gression of GDP per worker on proximate determinants, while Quah (1997) proposes a conditioned
stochastic kernel based on GDP per capita normalized with respect to a weighted sample average,
where weights are defined by geographical proximity or intensity of trade with other countries. By
considering the residuals of a regression, however, Quah (1996) can only obtain an estimate of the
joint distributional effect of the determinants included in the regression, while we are able to identify
the effect of individual variables. Quah (1997), instead, considers one variable at the time, but does
not control for the effect of other determinants. Johnson (2005) and Feyrer (2008), differently, explain
the income distribution dynamics by a comparison with the distributions of proximate growth deter-
minants, such as human capital, physical capital and total factor productivity, assuming a common
worldwide Cobb-Douglas production function. By allowing for the presence of growth regimes, we do
not assume the existence of a common production function.
Finally, the use of counterfactual analysis to study the determinants of distribution dynamics was
previously proposed by Beaudry et al. (2005), Cheshire and Magrini (2005) and Henderson and Russell
(2005). In particular, Beaudry et al. (2005) analyse the distributional effect of proximate determinants
comparing the periods 1960-1978 and 1978-1998, characterized by the emergence of polarization.
Their strategy consists in estimating counterfactual distributions for the second period assuming that
a factor of interest (e.g. the estimated coefficient of a growth regression or the distribution of a
growth determinant) maintains in the second period the same value of the first. Differently, Cheshire
7Partial exceptions are Desdoigts (1999), who does not specify any growth model, and Bos et al. (2010),
who estimate a stochastic frontier model assuming a translog production function. In addition, Maasoumi et al.
(2007) consider a nonlinear growth model assuming the existence of two regimes, i.e. OECD and non-OECD
countries, but focus is on growth rates’ distribution.
8The stochastic kernel is an operator mapping the current distribution into the future distribution. See
Appendix H for details.
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and Magrini (2005) estimate a growth regression, and then compute counterfactual distributions by
comparing a “predicted” stochastic kernel (computed on the basis of fitted values of growth regression)
with a “simulated” stochastic kernel (computed on the basis of alternative values of the determinants
in the growth regression), while Henderson and Russell (2005) propose a counterfactual analysis based
on the production-frontier approach. None of these works, however, allow for growth regimes and
nonlinearities.
3 The Methodology for the Empirical Investigation
To introduce our methodology consider Figure 1, which reports the estimated distributions of relative
(with respect to sample mean) GDP per worker in 1960 and 2008, along with the estimated long-run
equilibrium distribution, denoted as ergodic distribution for a sample of 84 countries.9 In the following
we will denote these three types of distribution as actual distributions.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 confirms the stylized fact emerging from the literature: the distribution is initially uni-
modal, but subsequently becomes twin-peaked (see, e. g., Quah, 1997). Moreover, the shape of the
ergodic distribution suggests that the tendency of polarization is doomed to persist in the long run.10
In terms of the BIPOL bipolarization index proposed by Anderson et al. (2012), polarization increases
from 0.75 in 2008 to 1.26 in the ergodic distribution. Inequality, measured by the Theil index, also
increases over the period: the index rose from 0.54 in 1960 to 0.68 in 2008.
Our aim is to identify the determinants of these changes in inequality and polarization through
a novel methodology. In particular, in Section 4 we will investigate the role of deep and proximate
determinants of growth by a methodology including six steps: i) the identification of growth regimes
in presence of nonlinearities (Section 3.1); ii) the specification and estimation of a nonlinear, regime-
specific growth regression (Section 3.2); iii) the decomposition of a country’s GDP per worker (Section
3.3); iv) the computation of counterfactual final (i.e. end-of-period) distributions (Section 3.4); v) the
estimation of counterfactual ergodic distributions (Section 3.5); vi) the evaluation of the distributional
effect of proximate determinants by their marginal growth effect (Section 3.6).
9See Appendix A for data sources, and Appendix 3.1.1 for the country list. Technical details on the estimation
can be found in the online Appendix. Dataset and codes are available at authors’ website.
10Silverman’s bootstrap tests for multimodality show that the null hypothesis of unimodality cannot be
rejected at the usual significance levels for the 1960 distribution, while it can be rejected at 1% of significance
for the 2008 distribution and for the ergodic distribution (Silverman, 1986). Henderson et al. (2008) find the
same results with a larger sample of countries (see their Table III).
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3.1 Identification of Growth Regimes
In this section we describe the procedure to identify growth regimes based on information theory which
has fundamental advantages with respect to existing methods (CART, GUIDE, threshold regressions,
finite mixture approach, etc.). The use of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) allows for model
selection with non-nested, non-linear models in presence of endogeneity and, at the same time, for
tackling model selection uncertainty by ranking the candidate models in terms of their probability of
being the best approximating model of the true model.11
The approach based on AIC has also advantages with respect to Bayesian methods: it does not
depend on the choice of prior probabilities and it is computationally less demanding when the number
of models under consideration is high. Even though model selection based on AIC implicitly assumes
that the “true” model is in the set of candidate models, which is likely to be false, Takeuchi (1976)
derives a generalized AIC robust to the absence of the “true” model in the candidate set, and concludes
that AIC represents a “parsimonious approach to bias correction” for the absence of “true” model in
the candidate set (see Anderson, 2007, p. 70). Finally, the use of Bayesian methods does not allow to
use information theory, which is at the basis of our approach to account for model selection uncertainty
(see Section 3.1.2 below). In particular, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the most known
alternative in Bayesian literature to AIC, which appears very similar to AIC to the casual eye, “has
[unfortunately] nothing linking it to information theory, [it is] a misnomer” (see Anderson, 2007, p.
160).
3.1.1 The Procedure to Explore all Potential Growth Regimes
The procedure to explore all potential growth regimes is articulated into five steps:
1. Define the set of deep determinants Z and consider a subset Zq. For each deep determinant, a
threshold value will be used to partition the sample.
2. On the basis of Zq identify all possible Pq partitions of countries by sequentially splitting the
sample.
For each subset q and partition p a maximum number of regimes Mq,p can be identified. Assign
each country to a growth regime and gather them in the set GRq,p =
{
Rq,p,1, ..., Rq,p,Mq,p
}
,
where Rq,p are the possible regimes. Collect all these partitions of countries in the set GRq ={
GRq,1, ...,GRq,Pq
}
.
3. For each growth regime estimate a semiparametric growth regression controlling for endogeneity
11See Anderson (2007) for a general introduction to this approach and Claeskens and Hjort (2008) for a
technical exposition of model selection based on AIC.
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using the Control Function Method, and obtain the residuals:
υˆq,p,i = gi − αˆt (mq,p)−
K∑
j=1
µˆj (Xi,j ,mq,p) ,
where mq,p is the growth regime of country i, given Zq and Pp.
4. Compute the total log-likelihood (up to a constant) of the model:
log (L)q,p = −
(
N
2
)
log
∑Mq,pm=1∑i∈Rq,p,m υˆ2q,p,i
N
 ,
and the related AICc:
AICcq,p = −2 log (L)q,p + 2F
(
N
N − F − 1
)
, (1)
where F is the total number of estimated parameters in the model.12
5. The minimum AICcq,p in q and p, AICcmin, jointly identifies i) the best partition of countries
into different growth regimes and ii) the best estimation of the semiparametric growth model
for each growth regime: this represents the best model for our sample.
The number of deep determinants that can be used in the identification of growth regimes is
limited by the number of countries N and sub-periods S, given that in each partition a minimum
number of observations is needed for the semiparametric estimation of the growth model. For example,
using two deep determinants, Zq = (Zq,1,Zq,2), and one threshold for each of them (Z
TRESH
q,1 and
ZTRESHq,2 ) implies searching for the existence of four growth regimes in the (Zq,1,Zq,2)-space. On
average, (N × S) /4 observations will be available for the estimation of the growth model within
each regime. In particular, in Figure 2 it is assumed that Zq,1 is the first partitioning variable,
and each partition cannot be populated by less than NMIN countries. The resulting partition can
include at least one, and at most four growth regimes (see Figure 3). Moreover, the total number
of possible partitions Pq depends on the number of deep determinants considered in the analysis,
and on the different values they display. For example, considering the same two deep determinants
Zq = (Zq,1,Zq,2), each one taking on N different values (i.e. the maximum, equal to the number of
countries in the sample), implies that Pq = N ×N = N2. This means that the maximum number of
partitions is equal to N2
(|Z|2 − |Z|).
[Figure 2 about here.]
12The use of semiparametric techniques increases the number of estimated parameters proportionally to the
identified nonlinearities (see Section 4.2).
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3.1.2 Model selection uncertainty
To account for the model selection uncertainty, we compute for each model the loss of information as
in Anderson (2007, pp. 84-86):
∆AICcq,p = AICcq,p −AICcmin, (2)
where AICcq,p is the AIC of Model (q, p) (corresponding to a partition p of countries and a subset q
of deep determinants, see Appendix 3.1.1) corrected for the degrees of freedom (see Anderson, 2007),
and AICcmin is the model with the minimum AIC among all the models considered in the procedure.
Thus, ∆AICcq,p ranks the candidate models: the larger ∆AICcq,p, the less likely Model (q, p) is the
best approximating model in the candidate set. The simple transformation:
exp
(
−∆AICcq,p
2
)
(3)
provides the likelihood of Model (q, p), and the following normalisation:
wq,p =
exp (−∆AICcq,p/2)∑
q
∑
p exp (−∆AICcq,p/2)
(4)
gives the probability of Model (q, p) to be the best model in the candidate set. It is worth remarking
that wq,p can be interpreted as the: “Bayesian posterior model probabilit[y] under the assumption of
savvy model priors” (see Anderson, 2007, p. 88), or as the probability to be the least false model under
the plausible assumption that the true model is unknown or too complex to be modelled (Claeskens
and Hjort, 2008). Our choice of the best model will be therefore based on the probabilities given by
Eq. (4). These probabilities provide an information similar to the tests on thresholds proposed by
Hansen (2000), but with the advantage, in presence of multiple thresholds, to be a joint test and not
a sequential test on each threshold.
3.2 Modelling Growth of Output Per Worker
Consider a set of countries indexed by i, i = 1, ..., N , partitioned into growth regimes indexed by m,
m = 1, ...,M . Denote the set of countries in regime m as Rm. Growth is observed over a period of T
years, indexed by t. Output per worker of country i at time t, yit, can be expressed as:
yit = yi0e
git, (5)
where yi0 is the initial level of output per worker and gi is the annual rate of growth.
The growth rate of country i is modelled by a semiparametric specification to account for nonlin-
earities, that is:
gi = α (m) +
K∑
j=1
µj (Xi,j ,m) + υi, (6)
9
where Xi = (Xi,1, ..., Xi,K) is a collection of K proximate determinants, α (m) is a constant term
for countries in Rm, µj(·,m) are one-dimensional nonparametric functions operating on each of the
K elements of Xi for countries in Rm, and υi is an error term with the properties: E(υi|Xi) = 0,
var(υi|Xi) = σ2 (Xi,m) (i.e. the model allows for heteroskedasticity). The semiparametric specifica-
tion allows for a varying marginal effect of proximate determinants on growth. As we will show in
Section 3.3 the semiparametric specification is crucial for the correct identification of the proximate
determinants’ distributional effect, i.e. their effect on inequality and polarization in the distribution
dynamics..
3.3 Decomposition of the Growth Rate
The starting point for the identification of the distributional effect of the k-th proximate determinant
is the decomposition of the growth rate. In particular Eq. (6) can be rewritten as:
gi = α (m) +
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
µj (Xi,j ,m) + µk (Xi,k,m) + υi. (7)
i.e.:
gi = g
−k
i + g
k
i + g
r
i , (8)
where g−ki is growth rate of output per worker obtained by “factoring out” the effect of Xi,k, i.e.
g−ki = α (m)+
∑K
j=1,j 6=k µj (Xi,j ,m); g
k
i = µk (Xi,k,m) is the part of the annual growth rate explained
by Xi,k, capturing the “marginal” effect of Xi,k on gi, that we denote as marginal growth effect ; g
r
i = υi
is the annual “residual growth”, not explained by the determinants in Xi.
3.4 The Counterfactual Distribution
We will compute two types of counterfactual distribution to identify the distributional effect of, respec-
tively, the proximate determinants and the growth regimes. In particular, we model the distributional
effect of a proximate determinant as determined by its sample distribution.
Let y˜kiT denote the counterfactual output per worker for the k-th proximate determinant, i.e. the
output per worker that country i would attain at T if there were no differences within the sample in
the level of the k-th determinant. To identify this effect, we impose upon each country the sample
mean of that determinant.13
13If the determinant of interest is characterized by the presence of outliers, the median of the distribution could
be preferable as a more robust measure. The use of the sample mean of the determinant aims at approximating
its average effect on countries’ growth. Other counterfactuals could be built using quantiles of the distribution.
For example, Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) compute counterfactual growth rates by imposing on each
country of their sample the value of the determinant of interest (an index of macroeconomic stability) measured
at the 95th percentile of the sample.
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Hence, the counterfactual growth rate of country i for the k-th proximate determinant, g˜ki , is
defined as:
g˜ki ≡ αˆ (m) +
∑
j 6=k
µˆj (Xi,j ,m) + µˆk
(
X¯k,m
)
, (9)
where X¯k = N
−1∑N
i=1Xi,k, and µˆk(·) is the estimated smooth function relative to the k-th determi-
nant, obtained from the estimation of Eq. (6). Therefore, the counterfactual output per worker of
country i at T is given by:
y˜kiT = yi0e
g˜ki T . (10)
The distribution of y˜kiT is the counterfactual distribution with respect to the k-th determinant. Given
the assumption on the existence of growth regimes, the effect of the k-th proximate determinant on
the distribution dynamics is evaluated within each regime.
The estimation of the counterfactual distribution for growth regimes is based instead on the idea
of a random assignment of each country to one of the M regimes. Let y˜Ri denote the counterfactual
output per worker for the growth regimes, i.e. the expected value of output per worker that country i
would attain at T if, instead of belonging to a specific regime, it had a probability 1/M of belonging
to one of the existing regimes.14 In particular, we compute the counterfactual growth rate of country
i for growth regimes as:
g˜Ri ≡
∑M
m=1
[
αˆ (m) +
∑
j µˆj (Xi,j ,m)
]
M
, (11)
from which we obtain the counterfactual output per worker of country i:
y˜RiT = yi0e
g˜Ri T . (12)
The distribution of y˜RiT is the counterfactual distribution with respect to the growth regimes. In a
pooled cross-section analysis, like the one we perform in Section 4, random assignment to regimes
amounts to assuming random transitions across regimes in each sub-period considered.
3.5 The Actual and Counterfactual Ergodic Distributions
The actual and counterfactual output per worker allow estimating the actual and counterfactual
ergodic distributions, based on the actual and counterfactual stochastic kernels for each determinant
and for growth regimes. In particular, the ergodic distribution highlights whether the estimated
distribution dynamics over the period of interest has completely exhausted its effects or, otherwise,
significant distributional changes are expected in the future.15
14An alternative counterfactual analysis corresponds to the case where regimes do not exist. When regimes
exist, as we show below, its computation is however not feasible because such a case cannot be observed.
15For details on the estimations see the online Appendix H.
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3.6 The Distributional Effect of Proximate Determinants
The distributional effect of a proximate determinant is evaluated by the conditional marginal growth
effect, and by the differences between the actual and counterfactual distributions at time T and in the
long run.
3.6.1 The Conditional Marginal Growth Effect
The effect of the k-th proximate determinant on the distribution dynamics is well captured by the
relation between the marginal growth effect (MGE) of the k-th determinant in Eq. (8), gki , and the
initial level of output per worker yi0, i.e. g
k
i |yi0, that we denote as conditional marginal growth effect
(CMGE) of the k-th determinant. It may be observed that the estimation of Eq. (6) must include all
the explanatory variables in order to avoid omitted-variable problems and obtain an unbiased estimate
of the marginal growth effect.
If E[gki |yi0] is not statistically different from the expected value of the marginal growth effect,
E[gki ], i.e. if E[g
k
i |yi0] = E[gki ] ∀yi0, then the k-th determinant has no distributional effects. On the
contrary, if E[gki |yi0] is statistically different from E[gki ] and, in particular, has everywhere an increasing
(decreasing) relation with yi0, then the k-th determinant is a source of divergence (convergence) within
a regime. Figure 4 shows the case of E[gki |yi0] decreasing in yi0, which implies a more dispersed
counterfactual distribution.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Clearly, other types of CMGE can be observed. For example, if E[gki |yi0] displays a ”v”-shaped form,
the determinant is a potential source of polarization within the regime.
3.6.2 Nonlinearities and Differences between Actual and Counterfactual Distri-
butions
In presence of nonlinearities in the growth model, the k-th determinant can have an effect on the
distribution dynamics even if the expected value of the CMGE is not statistically different from the
expected value of the MGE, i.e. if E[gki |yi0] = E[gki ] ∀yi0. In particular:
E [log (yiT ) |yi0] = E
[
log
(
y˜kiT
)
|yi0
]
, (13)
if:16
M∑
m=1
E [µk(Xi,k,m)|yi0] =
M∑
m=1
µk(X¯k,m). (14)
The condition in Eq. (14) holds under the following two (sufficient) conditions:
16See Appendix B for the derivation of the condition in Eq. (14).
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1. E [µk(Xi,k,m)|yi0] = E [µk(Xi,k,m)], i.e. µk(Xi,k,m) and yi,0 are mean-independent, i.e. the
effect of the k-th determinant on output per worker in country i has to be independent of the
initial output per worker in each regime m.
2. E [µk(Xi,k,m)] = µk [E(Xi,k,m)] = µk(X¯k,m), i.e. µk(·,m) = βmk Xmi,k; the marginal effect of
the k-th determinant has to be constant in each regime m, i.e. the term Xi,k in growth regime
m has a linear effect on growth.
Therefore, even if the CMGE of k-th determinant is not statistically different from the MGE (i.e.
Condition 1 holds),17 such a determinant can have a distributional effect if it has a nonlinear effect
on growth (i.e. Condition 2 fails). In growth empirics violations of Conditions 1 and 2 are common.
For example Durlauf et al. (2001) find violations of Condition 1, while Liu and Stengos (1999) find
violations of Condition 2. In Section 4 we show that also in our sample violations of these two
conditions generally occur.
4 Explaining the Evolution of the World Income Distri-
bution
In this section we apply the methodology described in Section 3. In particular, in Section 4.1 we
describe the dataset, in Section 4.2 we report the estimate of the best model, in Section 4.3 we inves-
tigate the distributional effect of proximate determinants and of growth regimes by a counterfactual
analysis and, finally, in Section 4.4 we provide a summary and a general discussion of our findings.
4.1 Data
Our sample consists of 84 countries for the period 1960-2008 (see Table 9 in Appendix C for the
country list). The dependent variable in the growth regressions is the average annual growth rate of
GDP per worker.
Drawing on the vast literature discussed in the introduction we consider as candidate determinants
of growth regimes five main types of “deep” determinants: initial conditions, i.e. the values in 1960
of GDP per worker, human capital (in particular the share of workforce with primary or secondary
education), and life expectancy at birth;18 geography, proxied by the absolute value of latitude, the
malaria ecological index, the percentage of tropical area, the land area within 100 km of distance to
sea-coast or navigable rivers, the average number of frost-days, and the proportion of land with five
17Note that by definition gki ≡ µk(Xi,k).
18Life expectancy at birth is a typical proxy for the health conditions of a country. A large literature considers
education and health within a broader concept of human capital (see, e.g. Mushkin, 1962, Sachs and Warner,
1997 and Weil, 2007).
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or more frost-days per month (see, e.g., Tan, 2009, Rodrik, 2002); the quality of institutions, proxied
by the initial level of democracy or of constraints on the executive; a measure of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997); and culture, proxied by different shares of
population in 1965 belonging to the following religious denominations: Protestant, Catholics, Muslims,
Animists (see, e.g., Rodrik, 2002, Guiso et al., 2006, Durlauf et al., 2008). Following Mankiw et al.
(1992) we consider as proximate determinants the initial level of GDP per worker, the investment
rate, the growth rate of employment, and human capital, in the form of average years of schooling.19
Three remarks are in order on the sources of data. First, we choose PWT 7.1 instead of the
more recent PWT 9.0 to maximize the number of countries available in the sample.20 Second, we
use the most recent version (2.0) of Barro and Lee (2013)’s dataset on human capital, in which many
shortcomings of the previous versions have been eliminated (see Cohen and Leker, 2014, for details).21
Finally, the number of countries in the sample is reduced with respect to its potential largest value
based solely on data from PWT for the inclusion of institutions (with a reduction from a potential
sample size of 109 to 90 countries) and, secondly, of human capital (with a reduction to 97 countries).
Overall, the inclusion of both variables restricts the sample to 85 countries. Finally, the inclusion of
life expectancy implies a further reduction to 84 countries.
4.2 The Best Model
In the estimation of the semiparametric growth model in Eq. (6), we pool cross-section data on five
sub-periods: 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2008. The dependent variable, git,
is the average annual growth rate of GDP per worker of each sub-period. The proximate determinants
are: i) the (log of) the initial level of GDP per worker of the sub-period, whose effect proxies for
technological catch-up and/or decreasing marginal productivity of capital (log.y0); ii) the (log of)
average annual growth rate of employment augmented by the depreciation rate and the exogenous
rate of technological progress (equal to 0.03 and 0.02 respectively, see Mankiw et al., 1992) (log.n);
iii) the (log of) the average annual investment rate (log.i/y); and, iv) the (log of) average years of
schooling (log.h) as a proxy for the stock of human capital. Averages are computed over each sub-
period. The growth model includes time dummies to account for possible changes across sub-periods
in the exogenous growth rate of technological progress.
19See Appendix A for the definition, source and descriptive statistics of the variables.
20The use of PWT 9.0 would limit the number of countries to 61; the reasons of this strong reduction
is related to the different use of the several rounds of the International Comparison Program, see: http:
//www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/v80/comparing_pwt80_with_pwt71.pdf for more details.
21The use of one of the most important alternative datasets, proposed by Cohen and Soto (2007), provides
measures of human capital highly correlated with the ones used in the paper (never below 0.91), but it would
reduce the sample to 79 countries.
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Proximate determinants in growth regression are likely to be endogenous for several reasons, in
particular for: simultaneity (when an explanatory variable is jointly determined with the dependent
variable, typically because both variables depend on an omitted explanatory variable) and measure-
ment error. The identification of valid and strong instruments is highly debated in the growth empirics
literature. Durlauf et al. (2005, p. 638-639) point out that: “the belief that it is easy to identify valid
instrumental variables in the growth context is deeply mistaken. We regard many applications of
instrumental variable procedures in the empirical growth literature to be undermined by the failure
to address properly the question of whether these instruments are valid [...] Since growth theories are
mutually compatible, the validity of an instrument requires a positive argument that it cannot be a
direct growth determinant or correlated with an omitted growth determinant”. Bazzi and Clemens
(2013) provide evidence on ways instruments that are valid in some studies can be invalid in others,
and show the ways in which plausibly valid instruments can mask important weak instrument biases.
In the estimation of growth regressions within each regime, we control for the presence of endogene-
ity in all proximate determinants (except for the initial level of GDP per worker) using as instruments
their value in 1960. Although we expect such instruments to be relevant and strong, some concerns
about their validity are present. A large literature relates growth to initial conditions and initial stocks
of human capital (e.g. Cohen, 1996 and Goetz and Hu, 1996). Moreover, the initial levels of invest-
ment rate and employment growth could easily be correlated with omitted growth determinants and,
therefore, our instrumental variables could be correlated with omitted growth determinants. However,
in our analysis some of these potentially omitted determinants are likely included in the candidate set
of deep determinants and the use of a semiparametric specification reduces the possibility that model
misspecification would lead to endogeneity. Moreover, we provide a test of omitted-variable bias due
to initial conditions proxied by the initial level of GDP per worker (see Appendix G for details). Given
the presence of semiparametric additive components, we used the Control Function Method (CFM)
instead of two-stage least squares (see Appendix F).
4.2.1 Growth Regimes
The best (approximating) model among all the ones that were fitted, identified following the procedure
described in Section 3.1, contains three growth regimes based on life expectancy at birth in 1960 and
the share of Catholic population in 1965: a “high life expectancy regime” (Regime H ) comprising 20
countries; a “low life expectancy/high share of Catholics” regime (Regime LH ) comprising 47 countries,
and, “low life expectancy/low share of Catholics” regime (Regime LL), comprising 17 countries (see
Figure 5). In particular, the threshold for life expectancy is equal to 68.35 years, while the threshold
for the share of Catholics is equal to 0.03 for the “low life expectancy” countries. Table 9 in Appendix
C contains the list of countries in the three regimes. The best model has a 99% probability to be the
best (approximating) model among all those that were fitted, as showed in Table 8 in Appendix C.
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Moreover, taken life expectancy and the share of Catholics as partitioning variables, in order to check
the robustness of the thresholds we calculate the (conditioned) probabilities of the models estimated
for all possible partitions of countries to be the least false. Our best model has a probability of about
30% to be the least false, and only six alternative partitions have more than 5% of probability but
involve only marginal changes in the thresholds (see Figure 9 in Appendix C).
The importance of taking into account the possible existence of growth regimes can be appreci-
ated by comparing the value of AICc of our best model, equal to 2230.49, with that of the pooled
regression without regimes equal to 2081.81 (the implied probability that the pooled regression to be
the least false model is about zero).22 Moreover, if we consider the deep determinants as proximate
determinants (i.e. they are included as covariates), as is commonly done in the literature, AICc surges
to 2100.59 when only life expectancy and the share of Catholics are considered, and to 2102.62 with
the additional inclusion of one variable for each type of deep determinants, i.e. latitude, democracy,
and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (their implied probabilities to be the least false model are both
about zero). Overall, this evidence suggests that growth regimes are strongly informative on the
countries’ dynamics, and our identifying deep determinants, life expectancy and share of Catholics,
contain (almost) all the information of the set of candidate deep determinants.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Regime H mainly includes Western countries and countries from the Western offshoots; Regime
LH comprises two European countries (Portugal and Romania), some Arabic countries, all Central
and South American countries, many Sub-Saharan countries and South Africa, and Sri Lanka, the
only Asian country; Regime LL mainly contains Asian countries, in particular from Middle-East and
South-East Asia, two Sub-Saharan countries, and Greece. The three growth regimes can be ordered
in terms of their average relative GDP per worker in 1960: 2.35 (H), 0.63 (LH), and 0.44 (LL).
Their average growth rate of GDP per worker over the period was respectively 2.1%, 1.1%, and 2.6%,
suggesting that convergence only occurred between Regimes LL and H. Indeed, in 2008 their average
relative GDP per worker becomes, with respect to the sample mean, 2.42 (H), 0.51 (LH), and 0.70
(LL), showing that, on average, countries in LL surpassed countries in LH.
The identified regimes are not strictly related to long-run outcomes, but they correspond to dif-
ferent growth models, e.g. having or not a high life expectancy at birth in 1960 or a certain share of
Catholics in 1965 is not unambiguously related to experiencing a high or low growth rate or converge
to a certain GDP level. Only in the case of high-life expectancy at birth we have a clear-cut identifica-
tion of highly-developed countries. In this case culture does not partition countries.23 Life expectancy,
22Results are available upon request.
23This result is in contrast with Desdoigts (1999) who finds a cluster of developed countries in which a
partition into Protestant and Catholic groups emerges.
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in particular, prevails on the quality of institutions for these countries, perhaps not surprisingly in
the light of the evidence discussed in Weil (2014) on the primacy of health for the development of
countries. Regime LH highlights the emergence of a similarity based on the share of Catholics for
countries from Africa and South America, suggesting that the widespread use of continental dummies
in growth empirics might not be fully appropriate.
Our results are in contrast with Owen et al. (2009), Tan (2009), and Flachaire et al. (2014) who,
adopting different methodologies, find a primacy of institutions on initial level of human capital and
geography in the identification of (only two) growth regimes. Moreover, differently from Tan (2009),
we do not find that ethnic fractionalization identifies growth regimes. However, none of these works
included religion among the possible regime identifiers. In this respect, in their seminal work on
growth regimes Durlauf and Johnson (1995, p. 378), remark that some anomalies of their partition in
four growth regimes may be explained by omitted initial conditions, such as social capital, that should
proxy for: “cultural norms and values ... which may range from attitudes towards work to respect of
property rights”. Surprisingly, subsequent work on growth regimes mainly ignored this remark and
no study, to the best of our knowledge, assessed the importance of culture as a possible deep growth
determinant.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 presents a re-examination of the tendency of polarization reported in Figure 1 as the
result of the distribution dynamics between and within the three growth regimes. Table 1 shows that
inequality, measured by the Theil index, increased by 5 percentage points between 1960 and 2008.
In particular, both the between- and within-group components show a moderate increase, while the
between-group component accounts for the largest share of inequality in both years. Polarization is a
phenomenon emerging only at the end of the period: the BIPOL index is in fact not computable for
the distribution in 1960 which is clearly unimodal.
Figure 6 highlights that the emergent polarization is the result of a strong tendency for convergence
within Regime H, and a substantial immobility of the distribution of countries in Regime LH, char-
acterized only by a slight tendency to within-group convergence. Countries in Regime LL, although
starting from an average initial per worker GDP lower than those of Regime LH, display a tendency to
spread out on a larger GDP range, in particular for the presence of some fast-growing economies such
as China and South Korea. We interpret this evidence as supporting the presence of club convergence,
where club membership is determined by the share of Catholics in 1965 and life expectancy at birth
in 1960. Anderson et al. (2016) find a similar dynamics among three income groups identified by a
finite mixture model. In particular, their analysis of transitions in 1970-2010 reveals that convergence
only occurred between the low-income and middle-income groups.
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To further characterize the regimes, Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the
distribution of proximate determinants for the whole sample and within each regime (see also Figure
10 in Appendix D).24 Initial income is on average higher and less dispersed in Regime H, while no
significant differences exist in the average levels of Regimes LH and LL, but the distribution is different
as two peaks characterize Regime LH. The main aspect of the distributions of the employment growth
rate is that it is on average lower in Regime H. No remarkable differences appear in the investment rate
across Regimes, while human capital appears clearly higher on average and less dispersed in Regime
H.
[Table 1 about here.]
Among the identified regimes, Regime H has the characteristics predicted by UGT of Galor and
Weil (2000): high income, low employment growth (which may proxy for low population growth),
and, overall, high human capital levels.25 The striking feature of our results is that the variable that
better identifies this regime is life expectancy at birth in 1960, supporting the idea that a sufficiently
high level of health is a necessary condition for the accumulation of human capital. However, the
characteristics of the other two regimes do not support the prediction of UGT, in particular we do
not find any difference in their demographic patterns.
4.2.2 Semiparametric Growth Regressions
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the semiparametric growth model in Eq. (6) within each
regimes. In each estimation exogeneity cannot be rejected at 5% significance level.26 As expected,
results of the first-stage regressions show that almost all the instruments are significant (Tables 10-12
in Appendix F). However, as discussed in Section 4.2, our instruments could be invalid. Although
this hypothesis cannot be formally tested, we find some evidence in favour of its validity. Ashley
and Parmeter (2015) quantify the minimum degree of correlation between the possibly-endogenous
variables and the model errors which is sufficient to overturn the inference on the regression parameters.
By applying their methodology to the Mankiw et al. (1992)’s model (as in our case), they find that quite
substantial correlations are necessary to reverse the inference on the estimated parameters, concluding
that in such case the need for valid instruments is mitigated. Moreover, in a recent paper Guo et al.
(2016) study the properties of the endogeneity test under invalid instruments and find that if some
instruments (even a single) are moderately (or strongly) invalid, then the endogeneity test will always
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity even if there is truly no endogeneity present. Accordingly, if
24Feyrer (2008) and Johnson (2005) proposed to explain the income distribution dynamics by the distribution
of growth determinants. We will see that, without accounting for nonlinearities, this approach can be misleading.
25See also Kuznets and Murphy (1966) on the concept of modern growth.
26See Appendix F and online Appendix I for the details on the estimations.
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our instruments were invalid we would have always rejected the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Finally,
no omitted-variable bias seems to be present in the best model at 5% significance level (See Appendix
G).
[Table 2 about here.]
The goodness of fit, measured by generalized R2, is fairly high in all the regimes, ranging from
0.43 in Regime LH to 0.74 in Regime H.27 A comparison of the estimation of a growth model without
regimes, reported in the first column of Table 3, and the models estimated within each regime, shows
that not accounting for growth regimes represent a serious miss-specification of the model. The esti-
mation of the regime-specific growth models reported in columns 2-4 of Table 3 highlights substantial
parameter heterogeneity across regimes, both in terms of magnitude of non-explained growth (see the
estimated values of the intercept and of the time dummy coefficients), and nonlinearities. In particu-
lar, the time average of non-explained growth, which reflects total factor productivity (TFP) growth,
is equal to 2.1% in Regimes H, to 1.1% in Regime LH and to 2.6% in Regime LL.28 The values of the
time dummies also show that countries in Regimes LH and LL seem to be more sensitive to shocks
than countries in Regime H. All proximate determinants are statistically significant at usual signifi-
cance levels, with the exception of the investment rate in Regime LL and human capital in Regimes
H and LH.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 7 reports the effects of each proximate determinant on growth of GDP per worker, along
with the estimated effect of each determinant in the model with no regimes (labelled as pooled). The
relation between initial per worker GDP and the growth rate highlights the tendency to within-regime
convergence. This tendency is clear in Regimes H and LH, although the estimated function is steeper
in Regime H, indicating a higher speed of convergence. The estimated function is instead concave
in Regime LL, indicating that a moderate but not-uniform tendency to within-regime catching-up
characterizes this regime. Employment growth has the expected negative marginal effect on growth in
all regimes, with nonlinearities in Regimes LL and LH. The effect of the investment rate on growth is
non-significant in Regime LL, while it is nonlinear in Regimes LH and H. Given the large confidence
27The better fit of the augmented Solow model in the group of the most developed countries is found in other
studies (see, e.g., Durlauf and Johnson, 1995, p. 375, Tan, 2009, p. 1119, Owen et al., 2009, p. 276) which,
however, do not allow for nonlinearities within the regimes.
28The time-averaged non-explained growth in regime H is calculated as the weighted average of the following
values: 2.8%, 1.5%(=2.8%-1.3%), 1.8%(=2.8%-1.0%), 2.8%(=2.8%-0%) and 1.7%(=2.8%-1.1%), with weights
10/48, 10/48, 10/48, 10/48 and 8/48 respectively. Non-explained growth in the other regimes is computed in
the same way.
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bands, however, in the latter two regimes the effect is likely to be non-increasing in relevant ranges
of the variable. Finally, human capital has a clear, positive marginal effect on growth in Regime LL
only.29
4.3 Distributional Effects
In this section we present the estimated distributional effect of each proximate determinant and of
growth regimes, while we refer to Section 4.4 for a general discussion of our findings.
Table 4a shows that the counterfactual distribution of initial GDP per worker is characterized by
a much higher value of the Theil index, implying that initial GDP per worker remarkably reduces
inequality: if all countries had had the same value of initial GDP per worker, inequality would have
been much higher. This effect is mainly due to the between-group component, which would have been
three times higher. Figure 13a highlights that, in the counterfactual distribution for their regime,
countries in Regime H would have had a much higher level of GDP per worker. In particular, given
that the conditional marginal growth effect in Regime H has a steep negative slope (see Figure 11a),
“assigning” the sample average value of log.y0 to all countries in that regime would amount to assign
to these countries a much higher growth rate than the one that most of them actually experienced.
The counterfactual distribution of Regime LH is not very different from the actual one, while for
Regime HH the counterfactual distribution shows that some countries would have been even further
away from the others with very high income levels. Moreover, initial GDP per worker strongly reduces
polarization: Table 4a shows that in 2008 the polarization index is much higher in the counterfactual
distribution. The same tendency is confirmed for the long run, as illustrated by a comparison of the
BIPOL index for the actual ergodic distribution (AED) and the one computed for the counterfactual
ergodic distribution (CED), as well as their graphical representation in Figure 13d.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
The growth rate of employment moderately increases inequality as the Theil index and its between-
group component are slightly higher in the actual than in the counterfactual distribution (see Table
4b). The effect is overall small, as shown by the negligible differences between actual and counterfactual
distributions in Figure 13b and the almost flat conditional marginal growth effects reported in Figure
11b. Also, employment growth moderately acts in favour of polarization, as shown by the values of the
29For Regime H this may reflect the sorting of the countries, which have reduced the cross-country variation
in human capital within this regime.
20
BIPOL index. The effect on polarization is more pronounced in the comparison between the actual
and counterfactual ergodic distributions (see Figure 13e).
The investment rate appears to slightly increase inequality, as the Theil index is higher in the actual
than in the counterfactual distribution. This mainly appears to depend on within-group inequality
(see Table 4c). However, the investment rate reduces polarization, as the BIPOL index is lower in
the actual distributions (both in 2008 and in the long run, see also Figure 13f). Overall, the effect is
modest (see Figures 13c and 11c).
Human capital tends to marginally decrease inequality and polarization (see Table 4d). Exami-
nation of the Theil index reveals that human capital reduces between-group inequality, but increases
within-group inequality. In fact, due in particular to the strong positive effect in Regime LL (Figure
11d), human capital contributed to the growth and catching-up of these countries, which would have
been otherwise more dispersed (see Figure 8a). In the long run, human capital generated a less-
polarized distribution than the one that would have obtained if all countries shared the same human
capital value (Figure 8c).
Growth regimes are a major source of inequality and, especially, of polarization. Table 4e shows
that both components of the Theil index are lower in the counterfactual than in the actual distribution.
In other words, if countries were allowed to randomly switch among regimes in each sub-period, the
distribution of the expected value of their counterfactual GDP per worker would have displayed less
inequality. Figure 8b highlights that countries in Regime LH would have displayed a much higher
mobility onwards, while countries in Regime LL would have been much less dispersed. The most
striking result, however, is that the counterfactual distribution of 2008 and the counterfactual ergodic
distribution do not show evidence of polarization, as shown by the dynamics displayed in Figure 8d.
4.4 Discussion of Results
Our findings contribute to the debate on the evolution of the cross-country income distribution in
many respects. First, the roots of the observed increase inequality and polarization do not seem
ascribable to the traditional Solovian growth determinants, i.e. the accumulation of physical capital
and employment growth, but to the existence of growth regimes, i.e. of different growth processes
followed by countries. This result is in contrast with, among others, Beaudry et al. (2005) and Feyrer
(2008).
Three main differences among regimes emerged: i) the levels of TFP growth are remarkably
heterogeneous. In particular, TFP growth is very similar in Regime H and Regime LL (equal to 2.1%
and 2.6% respectively), while in regime LH it takes on a value approximately half of the value of the
other regimes equal to 1.1%; ii) the conditional marginal growth effect of initial GDP, a proxy for
technological catching-up, is decreasing in Regimes H and LH and nonlinear in Regime LL; iii) the
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marginal growth effect of human capital is significant and strongly increasing in GDP per worker in
Regime LL only.
The result at point i) offers a novel view on religion, viewed by economists as one of the primary
determinants of culture (see, e.g., Weil, 2012, p. 436 and Guiso et al., 2006), although its impact
on growth is a controversial issue (Guiso et al., 2006): the influential study of Barro and McCleary
(2003) for example finds that some measures of religious behaviour significantly affect growth, while,
e.g., Durlauf et al. (2012) subsequently played down the role of religion.
We find that religion is associated to remarkably different levels of TFP growth only for countries
with low life expectancy in 1960. This result is consistent with the claim of Guiso et al. (2006)
according to which: “[the] dependence of [growth] on cultural variables weakens for more educated
people, consistent with the idea that more educated individuals rely less on their inherited culture
when they form their priors.” In our case, the significant dimension of human capital is not education
but health. Among the countries with low life expectancy, i.e. countries where inherited culture
could crucially affect individual decisions, we find that Catholic religion appears associated to lower
TFP, suggesting in our view a lower capacity of adopting foreign technology and/or develop new ones.
These countries therefore appear endowed with low levels of social capability, a concept introduced
by Abramovitz (1986), referring to the capacity of a country to introduce new ideas and to exploit
existing ones, to capture economic opportunities, etc.. This evidence complements the findings of
Guiso et al. (2006) on the importance of culture, as proxied by trust, for economic development.
Our finding of a negative correlation between Catholic religion and TFP levels, in particular in
Regimes LH and LL, seems at odds with the historically high Catholic propensity in establishing
education institutions (see, e.g., Bader and Maussen, 2012 for Europe) as education, by increasing
human capital accumulation, should favor technology development and/or adoption.30 Becker and
Woessmann (2009) make a similar point with respect to the diffusion of Protestantism. They argue
that the spread of Protestantism implied the diffusion of education to promote literacy development,
and that this, and not the spread of the “Protestant ethic”, fostered economic growth. However, our
results do not support the “human capital view” on the role of religion on growth. In fact, in our
sample PRI.60 has a positive correlation both with PROT.65 and CAT.65, but only for the former
it is high and significant (in the same respect see Figure II of Becker and Woessmann (2009)),31
while SEC.60 has a positive correlation only with PROT.65.32 However, PROT.65 is not found as a
significant regime identifier.
The result at point ii) highlights that technological catching-up occurs within all regimes, but at
30We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
31Bivariate regressions of PRI.60 on PROT.65 and CAT.65 return coefficients of, respectively, 0.57 (s.e. 0.14)
and 0.21 (s.e. 0.08).
32Bivariate regressions of SEC.60 on PROT.65 and CAT.65 return coefficients of, respectively, 0.27 (s.e. 0.08)
and 0 (s.e. 0.05).
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different speed. In Regime H the speed of convergence is high and uniform for all countries (the slope
of the estimated relationship is almost constant); in Regime LH the speed of convergence is uniform
but almost nil; finally, in Regime LL, the speed of convergence is nil for very poor countries and very
high for the richest. This evidence is consistent with the observed differences in TFP growth among
regimes.
The result at point iii) instead supports the insight of Nelson and Phelps (1966) that the key role
of human capital is to facilitate the adoption of technology and not to be a productive factor per
se. In particular, we find a positive and significant marginal effect of human capital on growth in
Regime LL only (see Figure 7), the only regime which seems to have enjoined significant technological
spillovers from Regime H, with a very similar level of TFP growth. Human capital in the form of
education, therefore, appears an important growth determinant for countries with low life expectancy
at birth. In addition, if the major determinant of long-run growth is TFP (as argued, for example,
by Hall and Jones, 1999), the presence of remarkable differences in TFP across regimes casts doubt
on the primacy of institutions as a fundamental driver of long-term development (Acemoglu et al.,
2005), as we did not find institutions as a primary regime identifier. The higher relevance of culture
and health with respect to geography and institutions is consistent with Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013,
p. 341)’s claim that: “human traits are important to account for comparative development patterns,
quite apart from the effects of geographic and institutional factors”. An important caveat is that they
refer to long-term development, while we focus on a more recent and shorter period.
Finally, we document that in the period 1960-2008 inequality and polarization across countries
increased, and such a tendency is expected to continue in the long run. Specifically, the counterfactual
analysis suggests that the persistent nature of the twin-peaked distribution is to be attributed to
the existence of regimes and to the persistence of countries within each regime: if transitions across
regimes were allowed, the long-run distribution would have been single-peaked. In other words, the
estimate of a long-run polarized distribution suggests that no significant transitions across regimes have
been taking place in the period of analysis. This evidence challenges the idea that polarization is a
transitory phenomenon, as pointed out by Lucas (2000) and Galor (2007). Our evidence of a persistent
twin-peaked distribution, on the contrary, is in line with the much-discussed “middle-income trap”,
according to which many episodes of growth spurts by initially poor countries suddenly stop before
the complete catching-up with the richest countries has been achieved (see, e.g., Eichengreen et al.,
2012, World Bank, 2013, and Pritchett and Summers, 2014). With a different methodology Anderson
et al. (2016) arrive at a similar conclusion: in the period 1970-2010 they find catching-up from the
low- to the middle-income class, but not from the middle-income to the high-income class.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we contributed to the literature on growth empirics by proposing a new methodology
based on information theory which jointly identifies growth regimes and estimates a semiparametric
growth model within each regime. We applied our method to a sample of countries in 1960-2008,
a period characterized by an increase in inequality and polarization in the distribution of GDP per
worker. We found three growth regimes, identified by life expectancy in 1960 and the share of Catholics
in 1965. Countries in each regime follow specific nonlinear “augmented” Solow models. Our findings
point to heterogeneity in TFP across regimes, technological catching-up, and, marginally, human
capital, as the main determinants of the observed increase in inequality and polarization.
A general policy implication of our analysis is to adopt any action favouring transitions across
regimes. In particular, we do not find evidence of poverty trap determined by thresholds in the
level of GDP per worker in 1960, raising doubts on the utility of foreign aid (Easterly, 2006); on
the contrary, a qualified foreign aid pointing to guarantee an adequate level of health could be very
effective supporting regime transitions (see, in the same vein, Sachs and Warner, 1997 and Easterly,
2001). Stimulus to the accumulation of human capital, advocated by a large literature, instead, seems
to be effective only in specific cultural environments (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005).
Our findings also suggest some directions for further research. The first consists in integrating
the studies on the evolution of income distribution and technological catching-up (see, e.g., Phillips
and Sul, 2009 and Battisti et al., 2013) with those on the identification of growth regimes by spatial
econometric techniques, where proximity among countries is explicitly taken into account. In this
respect, a promising line of research is to consider growth models with technological spillovers modelled
as spatial externalities (see, e.g., Ertur and Koch, 2007). The second direction is to develop a more
sophisticated framework of model selection based on “multimodel inference” proposed by Anderson
(2007), which represents an alternative approach to Bayesian Model Averaging. The third direction
is to analyse transitions across regimes and, in this respect, to understand the reasons why countries
do not make such transitions. Jerzmanowski (2006), Bos et al. (2010) and Anderson et al. (2016)
represent interesting recent contributions in this line of research. Finally, it remains the key open
question of why culture (religion) appears to be so important for TFP growth, i.e. why international
technological spillovers can be mainly driven by culture.
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this paper circulated with the title: “On the Determinants of Distribution Dynam-
ics”. We thank Roberto Basile, Michele Battisti, Daniel Henderson, Paul Johnson, Andros Kourtellos,
Julie Le Gallo, Stefano Magrini, Thanasis Stengos, Joseph Zeira, and three anonymous referees for
24
many useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank seminar participants at the
Universities of Pisa, Florence and Palermo, and at SMYE 2009, ERSA 2010, ICEEE 2011, RCEA
Workshop 2013, and SNDE 2016. Remaining errors are our own responsibility.
25
References
Abramovitz, M. (1986). Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind. The Journal of Economic
History, 46(02):385–406.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run
growth. Handbook of economic growth, 1:385–472.
Anderson, D. (2007). Model based inference in the life sciences: a primer on evidence. Springer Science
& Business Media.
Anderson, G., Linton, O., and Leo, T. (2012). A polarization-cohesion perspective on cross-country
convergence. Journal of Economic Growth, 17:49–69.
Anderson, G., Pittau, M. G., and Zelli, R. (2016). Assessing the convergence and mobility of nations
without artificially specified class boundaries. Journal of Economic Growth, pages 1–22.
Ashley, R. A. and Parmeter, C. F. (2015). When is it justifiable to ignore explanatory variable
endogeneity in a regression model? Economics Letters, 137:70–74.
Bader, V. and Maussen, M. (2012). Religious schools and tolerance. Tolerance and Cultural Diversity
in Schools. Comparative Report, pages 87–107.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. W. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010.
Journal of development economics, 104:184–198.
Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. M. (2003). Religion and economic growth across countries. American
Sociological Review, 68:760–781.
Battisti, M., Di Vaio, G., and Zeira, J. (2013). Global divergence in growth regressions. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. DP9687.
Bazzi, S. and Clemens, M. A. (2013). Blunt instruments: avoiding common pitfalls in identifying the
causes of economic growth. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(2):152–186.
Beaudry, P., Collard, F., and Green, D. (2005). Changes in the world distribution of output per
worker, 1960-1998: how a standard decomposition tells an unorthodox story. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 87(4):741–753.
Becker, S. O. and Woessmann, L. (2009). Was weber wrong? A human capital theory of protestant
economic history. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124:531–596.
Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M. M. (2005). Human capital and technology diffusion. Handbook of
Economic Growth, 1:935–966.
26
Bloom, D., Canning, D., and Sevilla, J. (2003). Geography and poverty traps. Journal of Economic
Growth, 8(4):355–378.
Blundell, R. and Powell, L. (2003). Advance in Economics and Econometrics, chapter Endogeneity
in nonparametric and Semiparametric Regression Models, pages 312–357. Cambridge University
Press.
Bos, J., Economidou, C., Koetter, M., and Kolari, J. (2010). Do all countries grow alike? Journal of
Development Economics, 91(1):113–127.
Bowman, A. and Azzalini, A. (1997). Applied Smoothing Techniques for Data Analysis: the Kernel
Approach with S-Plus Illustrations. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Brock, W. (2001). Cycles Growth and Structural Change: Theory and Empirical Evidence, chapter
Complexity-based models in cycles and growth: any potential value?, pages 302–338. Routledge.
Burnham, K. P. and Anderson, D. R. (2003). Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A Practical
Information-Theoretic Approach. Springer Science & Business Media.
Cheshire, P. and Magrini, S. (2005). Analyzing growth distribution dynamics: isolating divergence
factors. Paper presented at 45th European Regional Science Association Congress, Cambridge(UK).
Claeskens, G. and Hjort, N. L. (2008). Model Selection and Model Averaging, volume 330. Cambridge
University Press.
Cohen, D. (1996). Tests of the ”convergence hypothesis”: some further results. Journal of Economic
Growth, 1(3):351–361.
Cohen, D. and Leker, L. (2014). Health and education: another look with the proper data. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. DP9940.
Cohen, D. and Soto, M. (2007). Growth and human capital: good data, good results. Journal of
Economic Growth, 12(1):51–76.
Desdoigts, A. (1999). Patterns of economic development and the formation of clubs. Journal of
Economic Growth, 4(3):305–330.
Durlauf, S. and Johnson, P. (1995). Multiple regimes and cross-country growth behaviour. Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 10(4):365–384.
Durlauf, S., Johnson, P., and Temple, J. (2005). Growth econometrics. In Durlauf, S. N. and Aghion,
P., editors, Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier.
27
Durlauf, S., Kourtellos, A., and Minkin, A. (2001). The local Solow growth model. European Economic
Review, 45:928–940.
Durlauf, S. N., Kourtellos, A., and Tan, C. M. (2008). Are any growth theories robust? The Economic
Journal, 118(527):329–346.
Durlauf, S. N., Kourtellos, A., and Tan, C. M. (2012). Is God in the details? A reexamination of the
role of religion in economic growth. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 27(7):1059–1075.
Easterly, W. (2001). The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in
the Tropics. MIT press.
Easterly, W. (2006). Reliving the 1950s: the big push, poverty traps, and takeoffs in economic
development. Journal of Economic Growth, 11(4):289–318.
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 1203–1250.
Eichengreen, B., Park, D., and Shin, K. (2012). When fast-growing economies slow down: International
evidence and implications for china. Asian Economic Papers, 11(1):42–87.
Ertur, C. and Koch, W. (2007). Growth, technological interdependence and spatial externalities:
Theory and evidence. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22:10331062.
Feyrer, J. (2008). Convergence by parts. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 8(1):1935–1690.
Flachaire, E., Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa, C., and Konte, M. (2014). Political versus economic institutions in
the growth process. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42(1):212–229.
Gallup, J. L., Sachs, J. D., and Mellinger, A. D. (1999). Geography and economic development.
International Regional Science Review, 22(2):179–232.
Galor, O. (1996). Convergence? Inferences from theoretical models. Economic Journal, 106(437):1056–
69.
Galor, O. (2007). Multiple growth regimes - Insights from unified growth theory. Journal of Macroe-
conomics, 29(3):470–475.
Galor, O. and Weil, D. N. (2000). Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian stagnation
to the demographic transition and beyond. American Economic Review, 90(4):806–828.
Goetz, S. J. and Hu, D. (1996). Economic growth and human capital accumulation: Simultaneity and
expanded convergence tests. Economics Letters, 51(3):355–362.
28
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2006). Does culture affect economic outcomes? Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 20(2):23–48.
Guo, Z., Kang, H., Cai, T. T., and Small, D. S. (2016). Testing endogeneity with possibly invalid
instruments and high dimensional covariates. arXiv:1609.06713.
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. (1999). ”Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker
than others?”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1):83–116.
Hansen, B. E. (2000). Sample splitting and threshold estimation. Econometrica, 68(3):575–603.
Hastie, T. and Tibshirani, R. (1990). Generalized Additive Models, volume 43. CRC Press.
Henderson, D., Parmeter, C., and Russell, R. (2008). Modes, weighted modes, and calibrared modes,
evidence of clustering using modality tests. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23:607–638.
Henderson, D. and Russell, R. (2005). Human capital and convergence: A production-frontier ap-
proach. International Economic Review, 46(4):1167–1205.
Heston, A., Summers, R., and Aten, B. (2012). Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for International
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Jerzmanowski, M. (2006). Empirics of hills, plateaus, mountains and plains: A Markov-switching
approach to growth. Journal of Development Economics, 81(2):357–385.
Johnson, P. (2005). A continuous state space approach to convergence by parts. Economic Letters,
86:317–321.
Johnson, P. and Papageorgious, C. (2017). What remains of cross-country convergence? Journal of
Economic Literature, forthcoming.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country
investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1251–1288.
Kourtellos, A. (2011). Chapter 13 Modeling Parameter Heterogeneity in Cross-Country Regression
Models, pages 367–387.
Kuznets, S. and Murphy, J. T. (1966). Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread,
volume 2. Yale University Press New Haven.
Liu, Z. and Stengos, T. (1999). Non-linearities in cross-country growth regressions: a semiparametric
approach. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14(5):527–538.
29
Lucas, R. E. (2000). Some macroeconomics for the 21st century. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
14(1):159–168.
Maasoumi, E., Racine, J., and Stengos, T. (2007). Growth and convergence: A profile of distribution
dynamics and mobility. Journal of Econometrics, 136(2):483–508.
Mankiw, N., Romer, D., and Weil, D. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic growth.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:407–437.
Maoz, Z. and Henderson, E. A. (2013). The world religion dataset, 1945–2010: Logic, estimates, and
trends. International Interactions, 39(3):265–291.
Masters, W. A. and McMillan, M. S. (2001). Climate and scale in economic growth. Journal of
Economic Growth, 6(3):167–186.
Mushkin, S. J. (1962). Health as an investment. The Journal of Political Economy, 70(5):129–157.
Nagelkerke, N. (1991). A note on a general definition of the coefficient of determination. Biometrika,
78(3):691–692.
Nelson, R. R. and Phelps, E. S. (1966). Investment in humans, technological diffusion, and economic
growth. The American Economic Review, pages 69–75.
Ng, S. and Pinkse, J. (1995). Nonparametric Two-step Estimation of Unknown Regression Func-
tions when the Regressors and the Regression Error are Not Independent. Universite´ de Montre´al,
De´partment de Sciences Economiques, Montre´al.
Owen, A., Videras, J., and Davis, L. (2009). Do all countries follow the same growth process? Journal
of Economic Growth, 14(4):265–286.
Phillips, P. C. B. and Sul, D. (2009). Economic transition and growth. Journal of Applied Economet-
rics, 24(7):1153–1185.
Pritchett, L. and Summers, L. H. (2014). Asiaphoria meets regression to the mean. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Quah, D. (1996). Convergence empirics across economies with (some) capital mobility. Journal of
Economic Growth, 1(1):95–124.
Quah, D. (1997). Empirics for growth and distribution: Stratification, polarization, and convergence
clubs. Journal of Economic Growth, 2(1):27–59.
R Development Core Team (2012). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0.
30
Rodrik, D. (2002). Institutions, integration, and geography: In search of the deep determinants of
economic growth. Modern Economic Growth: Analytical Country Studies.
Rodrik, D. (2003). In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton
University Press.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over
geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2):131–165.
Roeder, P. G. (2001). Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) indices, 1961 and 1985.
Sachs, J. D. (2003). Institutions don’t rule: direct effects of geography on per capita income. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1997). Fundamental sources of long-run growth. The American
Economic Review, 87(2):184–188.
Silverman, B. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. Chapman and Hall,
London.
Sirimaneetham, V. and Temple, J. (2009). Macroeconomic stability and the distribution of growth
rates. The World Bank Economic Review, 23(3):443–479.
Spolaore, E. and Wacziarg, R. (2013). How deep are the roots of economic development? Journal of
Economic Literature, 51(2):325–69.
Takeuchi, K. (1976). Distribution of informational statistics and a criterion of model fitting. Suri-
Kagaku (Mathematical Sciences), 153:12–18.
Tan, C. (2009). No one true path: Uncovering the interplay between geography, institutions, and
fractionalization in economic development. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25(7):1100–1127.
Temple, J. and Johnson, P. A. (1998). Social capability and economic growth. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(3):965–990.
Wand, M. and Jones, M. (1993). Comparison of smoothing parametrizations in bivariate kernel density
estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88:520–528.
Weil, D. (2007). Accounting for the effect of health on economic growth*. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(3):1265–1306.
Weil, D. (2012). Economic Growth. New York: Prentice Hall, ed.
31
Weil, D. N. (2014). Health and economic growth. In Handbook of Economic Growth, volume 2, pages
623–682. Elsevier.
Wood, S. (2006). Generalized Additive Models. An Introduction with R. Chapman and Hall, London.
Wood, S. (2011). Fast stable restricted maximum likelihood and marginal likelihood estimation of
semiparametric generalized linear models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (B), 1(73):3–36.
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT press.
World Bank (2013). China 2030. building a modern, harmonious, and creative society. International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and the Development Research Center
of the State Council, P. R. China.
World Bank (2015). World Development Indicators 2015. World Bank Publications. The World Bank.
32
Appendix
A Sources and Descriptive Statistics of Determinants
The dependent variables used in our analysis is:
• g is the annualized average growth rate of the real GDP chain per worker.
The deep growth determinants used in our analysis are:
• GDPpw.60 is the (log) of the real GDP chain per worker in the first year of the sample (rgdpwok
in Heston et al. (2012) PWT 7.1)
• PRI.1960 is the percentage of population aged 15 or above with at least primary education
and corresponds to the sum of lp, ls, and lh in Barro and Lee (2013) (“percentage of primary
(lp), secondary (ls), and tertiary (lh) attained in population”), in 1960.
• SEC.60 is the percentage of population aged 15 or above with at least secondary education and
corresponds to the sum of ls and lh in Barro and Lee (2013) (“percentage of secondary (ls) and
tertiary (lh) attained in population”), in 1960.
• LE.60 is the life expectancy at birth (years) in 1960 from World Bank (2015).
• DEM.60.65 corresponds to the average of the POLITY2 scores of the Polity IV dataset over
the period 1960-1965.33 In particular, the score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score
from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic)
to -10 (strongly autocratic).34
• CON.60-65 corresponds to the average of the XCONST score of the Polity IV dataset over the
period 1960-1965. In particular, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. A
seven-category scale is used: Unlimited Authority, Intermediate Category, Slight to Moderate
Limitation on Executive Authority, Intermediate Category, Substantial Limitations on Executive
Authority, Intermediate Category, Executive Parity or Subordination.35
33Due to the high number of missing values in 1960, we consider the average level of the variable over the
period 1960-1965.
34In particular, DEMOC is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (XRCOMP),
the openness of political participation (XROPEN ), the competitiveness of executive recruitment (PARCOMP),
and constraints on the chief executive (XCONST ).
35Notice that the XCONST also enters in the definition of the POLITY2 indicators.
33
• ELF.61 is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index of Roeder (2001) in 1961. In particular, we
use the index constructed using the Taylor and Hudson formula that uses none of the groupings
reported in the sources when data on sub-groups are available and treats racial distinctions
within ethnolinguistic groups as separate ethnic groups.
• ABS.LAT is the absolute value of countries’ latitude.
• ME is the Malaria Ecology index of Sachs (2003) predictive of malaria risk built upon climato-
logical and vector conditions on a country-by-country basis.
• TROP.AR is the percentage of land in the geographical tropics as in Gallup et al. (1999).
• LND100CR measures the proportion of a country’s total land area within 100 km of the ocean
or ocean-navigable river as in Gallup et al. (1999).
• AR.FR is the average number of frost-days within the country’s borders as in Masters and
McMillan (2001).
• 5.FR.DAYS is the proportion of the country’s land that receives five or more frost-days per
month as in Masters and McMillan (2001).
• PROT.65 is the percentage adherents in the country of Protestants in 1965 gather from Maoz
and Henderson (2013).
• CAT.65 is the percentage adherents in the country of Roman Catholics in 1965 gather from
Maoz and Henderson (2013).
• ISLAM.65 is the percentage adherents in the country of Islamics in 1965 gather from Maoz
and Henderson (2013).
• ANI.65 is the percentage adherents in the country of Animists in 1965 gather from Maoz and
Henderson (2013).
• log.y0 is the (log) of initial level of the real GDP chain per worker (rgdpwok in PWT 7.1).
The proximate growth determinants used in our analysis are:
• log.n is the (log) growth rate of employment, where workers are computed as the population
from 15 to 64 years obtained from:
workers = rgdpch/rgdpwok ∗ pop;
where rgdpch is the real GDP chain per capita and pop is the population in PWT 7.1.
• log.i/y is the (log) investment rate at constant price and corresponds to the variable ki in PWT
7.1 divided by 100.
34
• log.h is the (log) average years of schooling attained and corresponds to the yr sch in Barro
and Lee (2013).
Tables 5 and 6 contain the descriptive statistics and correlations among the determinants.
[Table 5 about here.]
B Derivation of the Differences between Actual and Coun-
terfactual Distributions
In this appendix we derive an expression to evaluate the difference between the actual and counter-
factual distributions. Consider the differences between the actual and the counterfactual distributions
at period T , by expressing the value of (log) actual output per worker in period T , yiT , in terms of
the estimated counterfactual output per worker, y˜kiT :
log (yiT ) = log
(
y˜kiT
)
+
M∑
m=1
α (m) + K∑
j=1,j 6=k
µj(Xi,j ,m) + µk(Xi,k,m) + υi
− αˆ (m)−
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
µˆj(Xi,j ,m)− µˆk(X¯k,m)
 , (15)
and taking the expected value of (the log of) actual output per worker of country i in period T
conditional upon the actual output per worker in period 0, that is:
E [log (yiT ) |yi0] = E
[
log
(
y˜kiT
)
|yi0
]
+
M∑
m=1
E [α (m)− αˆ (m) |yi0] +
+
M∑
m=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
E [µj(Xi,j ,m)− µˆj(Xi,j ,m)|yi0] +
+
M∑
m=1
(
E [µk(Xi,k,m)|yi0]− E
[
µˆk(X¯k,m)|yi0
])
+
+ E [υi|yi0] . (16)
If αˆ and µˆj (j = 1, ...,K), are conditional unbiased estimators of α and µ, and E [υi|yi0] = 0, Eq. (16)
reduces to:36
E [log (yiT ) |yi0]− E
[
log
(
y˜kiT
)
|yi0
]
=
M∑
m=1
{
E [µk(Xi,k,m)|yi0]− µk(X¯k,m)
}
. (17)
From Eq. (17), we can derive a condition for the equality of the expected values of the actual and
counterfactual (log of) output per worker at time T conditional on the initial level y0. In particular,
these values are equal, i.e.:
E [log (yiT ) |yi0] = E
[
log
(
y˜kiT
)
|yi0
]
, (18)
36Note that E
[
µˆk(X¯k,m)|yi0
]
= E
[
µˆk(X¯k,m)
]
= µk(X¯k,m) given that X¯k is constant with respect to i and
µˆk is an unbiased estimator of µk.
35
if:
M∑
m=1
E [µk(Xi,k,m)|yi0] =
M∑
m=1
µk(X¯k,m). (19)
C The Identification of Growth Regimes
The search of the best model is based on the exploration of all possible partitions based on the
chosen set of deep determinants. Given the number of countries (N = 84) and periods (S = 5),
the search is limited to partitions where each growth regime includes at least 11 countries, the deep
determinants jointly considered are no more than 2, and for each determinant we consider at most one
threshold (including the case in which the same determinant is used in the two steps). The sequence
in which the determinants are used to split the sample could be crucial. Therefore, for each couple of
deep determinants (Zq,1,Zq,2) the procedure is repeated switching the order of Zq,1 and Zq,2 in the
splitting. In the implementation of this method the thresholds are defined by the values that the two
deep determinants take in the sample. The results in terms of the minimum AICc for all couples of
candidate deep determinants is reported in Table 7, together with Bayesian posterior probability of
the best model for each couple of deep determinants (see Eq. (4)).
[Table 6 about here.]
The minimum level of AICc is found for the couple: life expectancy in 1960 and the share of Catholic
population in the country.
Table 9 contains the country list for the three growth regimes corresponding to the best model.
[Table 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
D Distribution of proximate determinants within regimes
[Figure 9 about here.]
E Conditional marginal growth effects
[Figure 10 about here.]
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F The Control Function Method and Endogeneity Test
The Control Function Method (CFM) treats endogeneity as an omitted variable problem, where
inclusion of estimated first-stage residuals as a covariate corrects the inconsistency of the regression
of the dependent variable on the endogenous explanatory variable. This method provides consistent
estimation of the underlying regression coefficients (see, e.g. Ng and Pinkse, 1995; Blundell and Powell,
2003). CFM is also used to perform the endogeneity test on the determinants of the growth model.
Following the CFM we use a two-stage procedure: i) first we run a semiparametric regression of
each endogenous variable on the exogenous determinants and the instruments; then ii) we insert the
first-stage residuals in the original semiparametric regression. To test the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of the first-stage residuals are jointly equal to zero, we use a Likelihood Ratio test.
As instruments we use the initial level of each variable (i.e., in 1960) for all the sub-periods of the
pooled dataset. In particular we use:
• for log.n: the augmented growth rate of employment in 1960 (log.n.1960);
• for log.i/y: the investment rate in 1960 (log.i/y.1960);
• for log.h: the number of years of schooling in 1960 (log.h.1960).
CFM is used in all estimations, that is for all the models estimated in the procedure to explore all
potential growth regimes. Results of the first-stage regressions are reported in Tables 10-12.
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
[Table 10 about here.]
G A Test for Omitted-variable Bias in the Growth Model
We propose a test to detect the presence of possible omitted-variable bias in the growth model. In
particular, from the estimation of Eq. (8) we obtain gˆri , the estimated residual growth of country i
defined as gˆri ≡ log (yiT /yˆiT ), where yˆiT is the fitted value of the estimated growth model. Collecting
the residual growth of all countries in the vector gˆr and the initial level of output per worker in the
vector y0, a test of omitted-variable bias in the growth regression is expressed as follows:
E[gˆr|y0] = E[gˆr] = 0 , ∀ y0. (20)
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If y0 is included in the set of proximate determinants, the condition in Eq. (20) ensures that no
omitted-variable inconsistency related to y0 is present in the estimation (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp.
61-63). The violation of Eq. (20) would result in biased and inconsistent estimation of the growth
model leading, in turn, to the inconsistency of the estimation of the distributional effect of proximate
determinants.
The condition in Eq. (20) can be tested using a global test. In particular, consider two competing
nested models for the residual growth:
Model 1 : gˆri = α+ ui; and
Model 2 : gˆri = α+m (yi0) + ui,
from which it is possible to formulate two alternative hypotheses H0 and H1:
H0 : E[gˆ
r|y0] = αˆ = gˆr = 0; and
H1 : E[gˆ
r|y0] = αˆ+ mˆ (y0) .
As in linear models we conjecture to compare the residual sum of squares from two competing nested
models by an F-test, where the nonparametric F statistic is given by:
F =
(RSS1 −RSS2)/(df2 − df1)
RSS2/df2
. (21)
Although no general expression for the distribution of the nonparametric F statistic is available, Hastie
and Tibshirani (1990) suggest that at least some approximate guidance can be given by referring to
an F distribution with (df1 − df2) and df2 degrees of freedom (see also Bowman and Azzalini, 1997,
pp. 153-154). When the (global) null hypothesis E[gˆr|y0] = 0 for each y0 is rejected according to the
F-test, a local test based on a bootstrap procedure can allow to identify which range of values of y0
is responsible for the rejection.
For the estimate of the best model, the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of mean-independence
between the residuals and GDP per worker in 1960 at the usual significance level of 5% (F = 0.001
with a p-value of 0.98). Moreover, Figure 12 reports the estimated distribution of the residual growth
(i.e. gˆr) conditional on GDP per worker in 1960 (i.e. y0) for the best model with growth regimes. We
also report the estimated conditional mean (i.e. E[gˆr|y0]) (thick line) with the corresponding 95%
confidence bands obtained by a bootstrap procedure, and a vertical line representing the estimated
unconditional mean (i.e. E[gˆr]), which is approximately zero as expected. Figure 12 shows that for
any level of GDP per worker in 1960 the conditional mean never differs from the unconditional mean
at the usual level of significance of 5%. Accordingly, we conclude that the estimate of the best model
with growth regimes does not suffer from omitted-variable bias, i.e. the estimated model appears
correctly specified, at least conditioning on GDP per worker in 1960.
[Figure 11 about here.]
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Online Appendix
H The Estimation of Actual and Ergodic Distributions
In this appendix we describe the estimation of output per worker distributions (actual, counterfactual,
and ergodic), and of the stochastic kernel, the operator that maps current distributions into future
distributions.
Estimation of the Distribution of Output per Worker
In the estimation of the actual distribution, we use an adaptive kernel, a procedure recommended
when observations vary in sparseness over the support of the distribution. Adaptive kernel estimation
is a two-stage procedure which mitigates the drawbacks of a fixed bandwidth in density estimation
(see Silverman, 1986, p. 101). In general, given a multivariate data set X = {X1, ...,XN} and a
vector of sample weights W = {ω1, ..., ωN}, where Xi is a vector of dimension d and
∑N
i=1 ωi = 1, we
first run the pilot estimate:
f˜ (x) =
1
N det (H)
N∑
i=1
ωik
{
H−1 (x−Xi)
}
, (22)
where k (u) = (2pi)−1 exp
(−12u2) is a Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth matrix H is a diagonal
matrix (d× d) with diagonal elements (h1, ..., hd) given by the optimal normal bandwidths, i.e. hi =
[4/ (d+ 2)]1/(d+4) σˆiN
−1/(d+4), where σˆi is the estimated standard error of the distribution of Xi. The
use of a diagonal bandwidth matrix instead of a full covariance matrix follows the suggestions in Wand
and Jones (1993). In the case of d = 1 we have H = det (H) = (4/3)1/5N−1/5σˆ. We then define local
bandwidth factors λi by:
λi =
[
f˜ (Xi) /g
]−α
, (23)
where log (g) =
∑N
i=1 ωi log
(
f˜ (Xi)
)
and α ∈ [0, 1] is a sensitivity parameter. We set α = 1/2 as
suggested by Silverman (1986, p. 103). Finally the adaptive kernel estimate fˆ (x) is defined as:
fˆ (x) =
1
N det (H)
N∑
i=1
λ−di ωik
{
λ−1i H
−1 (x−Xi)
}
. (24)
The Gaussian kernel guarantees that the number of modes is a decreasing function of the band-
width; this property is at the root of the test of unimodality (see Silverman, 1986, p. 139).
Estimation of the Ergodic Distribution
The ergodic distribution is the long-run distribution of the stochastic process regulating the transitions
across the state space, given in our case by relative output per worker levels. Its estimation requires the
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estimation of the stochastic kernel. A stochastic kernel is an operator mapping the density of a variable
at time θ into its density at time θ+ τ , τ > 0, and indicates for each level of the variable at time θ its
probability distribution at time θ + τ over the possible values of the variable. The relation between
the densities and the stochastic kernel can be summarized as: fθ+τ (z) =
∫∞
0 φτ (z|x) fθ (x) dx, where
z and x are values of the variable, and φτ (z|x) is the stochastic kernel. To estimate the stochastic
kernel φτ (z|x) ≡ φτ (z, x) /fθ (x) we estimate the joint density of z and x, φτ (z, x), and the marginal
density of x, fθ (x). In the estimation of φτ (z, x) we follow Johnson (2005), and use the adaptive
kernel estimator discussed above.
The ergodic distribution solves:
f∞ (x) =
∫ ∞
0
gτ (x|z) f∞ (z) dz, (25)
where x and z are two levels of the variable, gτ (x|z) is the density of x, given z, τ periods ahead,
under the constraint ∫ ∞
0
f∞ (x) dx = 1. (26)
Since in our estimates GDP per worker is normalized with respect to its average, the ergodic distri-
bution must satisfy the additional constraint:∫ ∞
0
f∞ (x)xdx = 1. (27)
In all computations we set τ = 49. The counterfactual stochastic kernel, which is used to estimate
the counterfactual ergodic distribution, is estimated considering as final distribution the counterfactual
output per worker at T . In presence of growth regimes, an ergodic distribution is computed for each
growth regimes and the overall ergodic distribution is the mixture of these regime-specific ergodic
distributions.
I The Estimation of a Semiparametric Growth Model
The estimation of Eq. (6) is obtained by penalized likelihood maximization (see Wood, 2011, for
details). The model is fitted by minimizing:
||y −Xβ||2 +
K∑
k=1
λk
∫ 1
0
[
µ′′k(x)
]2
dx, (28)
where y is the vector of response variables (gi in our case), X is the matrix of determinants, β is a
vector of parameters to be estimated, λk, k = (1, ...,K), are smoothing parameters, and the penalty,
which controls the smoothness of the estimate, is represented by the integrated square of second
derivatives of the smooth terms. The vector of parameters β originates from expressing every smooth
term in Eq. (6), µj(.), as:
µj(Xi,j) =
q∑
l=1
bl (Xi,j)βl (29)
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where bl (x) are basis functions and q is their number.
Parameters βl are chosen to minimize the function in Eq. (28) for given values of the smoothing
parameters λk (it is possible to show that the penalty can also be expressed as a function of β).
Smoothing parameters are in turn chosen by the minimization of the restricted maximum likelihood
(REML) score. Estimation proceeds by penalized iteratively re-weighted least squares (P-IRLS), until
convergence in the estimates is reached.
The semiparametric estimation is performed following the approach proposed by Wood (2006)
based on penalized regression splines. In particular, we used the mgcv package in R Development
Core Team (2012), with the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) option (see Wood, 2011).
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Figure 1: Actual distribution (AD) in 1960 (dotted line), in 2008 (solid line) and actual ergodic distribution
(AED) (dashed line) of GDP per worker for a sample of 84 countries.
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spectively).
Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 1960 0.42
(0.04)
0.24
(0.05)
0.18
(0.03)
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
BIPOL
AD 1960 NA
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
Table 1: Variable: GDP per worker. Theil in-
dex of total, between-group, and within-group
inequality and BIPOL index of polarization in
1960 and 2008. Bootstrap standard errors are
reported in parenthesis.
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Figure 7: Estimated nonparametric function µj(·) of Equation (6) for model without regimes
(light grey line, corresponding to columns 1 in Table 3) and for the best model with three growth
regimes (blue, orange and red lines, corresponding to columns 2-4 in Table 3 respectively). 95%
confidence bands (dotted lines) are derived from the estimated standard errors based on the
Bayesian posterior covariance matrix of the parameters (see Wood, 2011).
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Figure 8: Actual and counterfactual distributions.
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given life expectancy at birth in 1960 and the % of Catholics in 1965 as partitioning variables.
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Figure 10: Distribution of proximate determinants for the whole sample and within each growth
regime. Dotted vertical lines indicate the average value for the whole sample (black) and in
each growth regime (blue, orange and red for Regimes H, LH, and LL respectively). Densities
and averages are estimate from pooling observations of all periods for each growth regime.
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Figure 11: Conditional marginal growth effect in the growth regimes.
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Whole Sample Regime H Regime LH Regime LL
Initial GDP per worker
Mean 19535 46997 10760 11484
SD 19990 17182 10087 13530
(Augmented) Employment growth
Mean 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07
SD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Investment rate
Mean 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.24
SD 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.11
Human capital
Mean 5.66 9.07 4.67 4.38
SD 3.07 1.93 2.36 2.98
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of distribution of proximate determinants for the whole
sample and within each regime.
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No Regimes Regimes
Regime H Regime LH Regime LL
Dep. Var: g Pooled GAM Pooled GAM Pooled GAM Pooled GAM
1960-2008 1960-2008 1960-2008 1960-2008
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
D1970−1980 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
D1980−1990 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
D1990−2000 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
D2000−2008 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Semi-parametric coefficients: EDF EDF EDF EDF
log.y0 2.6∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗ 4.3∗∗∗
(9.88) (10.67) (4.96) (10.6)
log.n 1.0∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗
(49.83) (5.96) (5.06) (15.6)
log.i/y 1.0∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗ 2.3
(52.34) (3.49) (10.95) (1.39)
log.h 2.1∗∗ 1.0 1.9 1.0∗∗∗
(2.64) (2.52) (1.53) (0.009)
Endogeneity NO NO NO NO
Omitted-variable bias NO NO NO NO
Observations 420 100 235 85
Countries 84 20 47 17
Generalized R2 0.40 0.74 0.43 0.69
Scale estimate (*10−5) 39.7 6.7 42.2 29.6
REML score -1001.4 -291.0 -535.28 -179.94
AICc 2081.81 2230.49
Table 3: Estimates of semiparametric growth model in Eq. (6). Significant asymptotic levels: 1%”***” 5%”**”
10%”*”. Standard errors and F-values are reported between brackets for parametric and semi-parametric
coefficients respectively. GAM: Generalized Additive Model. EDF: estimated degrees of freedom in the
estimate of µj(·). Endogeneity: test on the presence of endogeneity and endogeneity-robust estimation via
Control Function (see Appendix F). Omitted-variable bias: test for omitted-variable bias with distributional
effects (see Appendix G). Generalized R2: generalization of R2 to be used in ML estimates (see Nagelkerke,
1991). Log.likelihood: the logarithm of model’s likelihood. Scale estimate: scale parameter (corresponding
to the residual variance of the estimation, see Appendix I). REML score: score of the restricted maximum
likelihood estimation (it provides the fundamental information on the specification of the model, see Appendix
I). AICc: Akaike Information Criterion calculated as in Eq.(1) in Appendix 3.1.1.
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Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
CD 2008 0.90
(0.09)
0.63
(0.10)
0.27
(0.08)
BIPOL
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
CD 2008 0.93
(0.74)
AED 1.26
(0.04)
CED 6.05
(0.40)
(a) Variable: log.y0.
Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
CD 2008 0.41
(0.05)
0.23
(0.04)
0.18
(0.03)
BIPOL
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
CD 2008 0.65
(0.41)
ED 1.26
(0.04)
CED 2.06
(0.03)
(b) Variable: log.n.
Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
CD 2008 0.43
(0.04)
0.28
(0.04)
0.15
(0.03)
BIPOL
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
CD 2008 0.82
(0.23)
ED 1.26
(0.04)
CED 2.02
(0.02)
(c) Variable: log.i/y.
Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
CD 2008 0.52
(0.05)
0.42
(0.04)
0.09
(0.02)
BIPOL
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
CD 2008 0.90
(0.30)
ED 1.26
(0.04)
CED 3.31
(0.04)
(d) Variable: log.h.
Theil Total Between-group Within-group
AD 2008 0.47
(0.05)
0.27
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
CD 2008 0.24
(0.03)
0.10
(0.02)
0.14
(0.02)
BIPOL
AD 2008 0.76
(0.17)
CD 2008 NA
(NA)
ED 1.26
(0.04)
CED NA
(NA)
(e) Variable: log.h.
Table 4: Theil index of total, between-group, and within-group inequality and BIPOL polariza-
tion index in 1960 and 2008 for the actual, ergodic, and counterfactual distributions. Bootstrap
standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure 13: Actual and counterfactual distributions.
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Table 5: Mean and standard deviation of growth rate, deep and proximate determinants.
g GDPpw.1960 PRI.60 SEC.60 LE.60 DEM.60.65 CON.60.65 ELF.61 ABS.LAT ME TROP.AR
Mean 0.02 11759.63 0.55 0.15 54.83 1.02 0.32 0.47 24.56 3.72 0.54
SD 0.03 11214.42 0.32 0.16 12.48 7.3 12.48 0.28 17.99 6.76 0.48
LND100CR AR.FR 5.FR.DAYS PROT.65 CAT.65 ISLAM.65 ANI.65 log.y0 log.n log.i/y log.h
Mean 0.47 7.12 0.4 0.11 0.39 0.17 0.09 9.24 -2.64 -1.57 1.52
SD 0.38 9.04 0.45 0.22 0.4 0.32 0.17 1.25 0.17 0.43 0.74
Table 6: Correlations among growth rate, deep and proximate determinants.
g PRI.60 SEC.60 LE.60 DEM.60.65 CON.60.65 ELF.61 ABS.LAT ME TROP.AR LND100CR
g 1 0.170 0.130 0.200 0.110 0.060 -0.210 0.190 -0.200 -0.230 0.170
PRI.60 0.170 1 0.710 0.910 0.710 0.290 -0.490 0.630 -0.570 -0.500 0.530
SEC.60 0.130 0.710 1 0.690 0.600 0.270 -0.310 0.520 -0.390 -0.520 0.340
LE.60 0.200 0.910 0.690 1 0.670 0.240 -0.580 0.670 -0.610 -0.610 0.550
DEM.60.65 0.110 0.710 0.600 0.670 1 0.240 -0.240 0.410 -0.390 -0.300 0.510
CON.60.65 0.060 0.290 0.270 0.240 0.240 1 -0.120 0.220 -0.170 -0.170 0.090
ELF.61 -0.210 -0.490 -0.310 -0.580 -0.240 -0.120 1 -0.600 0.560 0.560 -0.460
ABS.LAT 0.190 0.630 0.520 0.670 0.410 0.220 -0.600 1 -0.460 -0.900 0.260
ME -0.200 -0.570 -0.390 -0.610 -0.390 -0.170 0.560 -0.460 1 0.510 -0.370
TROP.AR -0.230 -0.500 -0.520 -0.610 -0.300 -0.170 0.560 -0.900 0.510 1 -0.170
LND100CR 0.170 0.530 0.340 0.550 0.510 0.090 -0.460 0.260 -0.370 -0.170 1
AR.FR 0.220 0.540 0.530 0.560 0.380 0.230 -0.480 0.870 -0.410 -0.820 0.100
5.FR.DAYS 0.220 0.500 0.510 0.600 0.310 0.160 -0.530 0.900 -0.480 -0.940 0.210
PROT.65 -0.020 0.420 0.290 0.400 0.400 0.160 -0.220 0.480 -0.150 -0.260 0.040
CAT.65 -0.120 0.260 -0.030 0.210 0.070 0.010 -0.160 -0.060 -0.310 0.130 0.220
ISLAM.65 0.010 -0.510 -0.320 -0.420 -0.340 -0.120 0.150 -0.080 0.240 -0.030 -0.210
ANI.65 -0.150 -0.530 -0.360 -0.570 -0.350 -0.110 0.450 -0.430 0.680 0.390 -0.420
GDPpw.1960 0.010 0.710 0.680 0.760 0.620 0.300 -0.370 0.650 -0.420 -0.550 0.330
log.y0 0.010 0.740 0.620 0.810 0.570 0.270 -0.480 0.640 -0.510 -0.590 0.490
log.n -0.350 -0.480 -0.330 -0.470 -0.340 -0.180 0.410 -0.570 0.260 0.490 -0.250
log.i/y 0.310 0.340 0.230 0.390 0.090 0.030 -0.190 0.240 -0.250 -0.290 0.140
log.h 0.050 0.760 0.620 0.760 0.540 0.250 -0.380 0.470 -0.550 -0.440 0.430
AR.FR 5.FR.DAYS PROT.65 CAT.65 ISLAM.65 ANI.65 GDPpw.1960 log.y0 log.n log.i/y log.h
g 0.220 0.220 -0.020 -0.120 0.010 -0.150 0.010 0.010 -0.350 0.310 0.050
PRI.60 0.540 0.500 0.420 0.260 -0.510 -0.530 0.710 0.740 -0.480 0.340 0.760
SEC.60 0.530 0.510 0.290 -0.030 -0.320 -0.360 0.680 0.620 -0.330 0.230 0.620
LE.60 0.560 0.600 0.400 0.210 -0.420 -0.570 0.760 0.810 -0.470 0.390 0.760
DEM.60.65 0.380 0.310 0.400 0.070 -0.340 -0.350 0.620 0.570 -0.340 0.090 0.540
CON.60.65 0.230 0.160 0.160 0.010 -0.120 -0.110 0.300 0.270 -0.180 0.030 0.250
ELF.61 -0.480 -0.530 -0.220 -0.160 0.150 0.450 -0.370 -0.480 0.410 -0.190 -0.380
ABS.LAT 0.870 0.900 0.480 -0.060 -0.080 -0.430 0.650 0.640 -0.570 0.240 0.470
ME -0.410 -0.480 -0.150 -0.310 0.240 0.680 -0.420 -0.510 0.260 -0.250 -0.550
TROP.AR -0.820 -0.940 -0.260 0.130 -0.030 0.390 -0.550 -0.590 0.490 -0.290 -0.440
LND100CR 0.100 0.210 0.040 0.220 -0.210 -0.420 0.330 0.490 -0.250 0.140 0.430
AR.FR 1 0.880 0.500 -0.150 -0.130 -0.270 0.580 0.530 -0.500 0.250 0.460
5.FR.DAYS 0.880 1 0.320 -0.130 -0.010 -0.350 0.580 0.600 -0.480 0.290 0.450
PROT.65 0.500 0.320 1 -0.260 -0.240 -0.110 0.490 0.330 -0.330 0.070 0.300
CAT.65 -0.150 -0.130 -0.260 1 -0.480 -0.310 0.160 0.240 0.040 -0.030 0.190
ISLAM.65 -0.130 -0.010 -0.240 -0.480 1 -0.010 -0.280 -0.230 0.220 -0.070 -0.400
ANI.65 -0.270 -0.350 -0.110 -0.310 -0.010 1 -0.430 -0.550 0.250 -0.290 -0.420
GDPpw.1960 0.580 0.580 0.490 0.160 -0.280 -0.430 1 0.820 -0.330 0.240 0.590
log.y0 0.530 0.600 0.330 0.240 -0.230 -0.550 0.820 1 -0.340 0.380 0.730
log.n -0.500 -0.480 -0.330 0.040 0.220 0.250 -0.330 -0.340 1 -0.130 -0.240
log.i/y 0.250 0.290 0.070 -0.030 -0.070 -0.290 0.240 0.380 -0.130 1 0.390
log.h 0.460 0.450 0.300 0.190 -0.400 -0.420 0.590 0.730 -0.240 0.390 1
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Table 7: AICc of the best model for each possible couple of deep determinants referred to the only best models for each couple of deep
determinants.
1st/2nd None GDPpw.60 PRI.60 SEC.60 LE.60 DEM.60.65 CON.60.65 ELF.61 ABS.LAT ME TROP.AR LND100CR AR.FR 5.FR.DAYS PROT.65 CAT.65 ISLAM.65 ANI.65
GDPpw.60 -2104.28 -2109.40 -2187.54 -2172.28 -2210.70 -2137.10 -2113.81 -2147.36 -2179.52 -2157.81 -2120.22 -2134.45 -2180.14 -2170.48 -2160.17 -2158.22 -2129.14 -2119.46
PRI.60 -2172.00 -2182.22 -2183.28 -2183.78 -2204.35 -2182.48 -2182.74 -2172.48 -2180.25 -2177.56 -2180.87 -2181.46 -2188.38 -2188.52 -2188.21 -2208.98 -2185.44 -2180.17
SEC.60 -2145.59 -2190.45 -2183.04 -2166.20 -2203.97 -2161.63 -2159.50 -2165.16 -2178.53 -2153.58 -2159.81 -2158.41 -2166.88 -2166.90 -2173.22 -2178.41 -2156.85 -2155.55
LE.60 -2189.19 -2201.71 -2192.33 -2197.46 -2210.83 -2192.17 -2193.01 -2198.05 -2200.34 -2200.36 -2200.34 -2195.76 -2205.15 -2205.48 -2201.64 -2230.50 -2198.04 -2196.54
DEM.60.65 -2140.51 -2165.58 -2173.29 -2170.23 -2193.75 -2153.29 -2149.78 -2160.87 -2191.90 -2155.48 -2160.04 -2163.46 -2173.57 -2174.71 -2177.15 -2167.32 -2149.17 -2151.49
CON.60.65 -2109.06 -2117.40 -2182.74 -2159.50 -2200.95 -2149.78 -2119.12 -2153.75 -2175.53 -2146.63 -2144.02 -2125.23 -2168.22 -2160.98 -2151.82 -2147.36 -2119.13 -2120.49
ELF.61 -2133.86 -2151.65 -2170.31 -2162.97 -2196.17 -2161.43 -2148.03 -2130.25 -2156.23 -2146.01 -2136.06 -2148.91 -2157.13 -2142.10 -2184.01 -2152.28 -2144.15 -2146.05
ABS.LAT -2150.10 -2186.77 -2180.61 -2170.46 -2212.17 -2183.60 -2164.32 -2170.37 -2161.62 -2159.61 -2163.55 -2163.04 -2172.48 -2173.07 -2198.74 -2184.38 -2160.68 -2146.09
ME -2124.77 -2186.08 -2177.56 -2153.58 -2200.36 -2150.11 -2137.46 -2156.24 -2159.61 -2142.05 -2149.61 -2132.83 -2149.47 -2149.47 -2175.13 -2162.63 -2137.53 -2129.80
TROP.AR -2119.33 -2186.77 -2183.79 -2169.59 -2212.17 -2183.60 -2150.67 -2171.59 -2152.19 -2152.76 -2119.33 -2140.26 -2134.10 -2129.18 -2165.25 -2157.53 -2141.54 -2125.19
LND100CR -2099.70 -2131.22 -2168.56 -2149.06 -2184.26 -2151.14 -2137.66 -2148.91 -2160.79 -2132.83 -2140.64 -2134.41 -2158.96 -2136.04 -2157.58 -2147.15 -2119.51 -2116.60
AR.FR -2125.11 -2190.42 -2196.09 -2172.44 -2219.16 -2190.76 -2156.95 -2175.45 -2159.20 -2166.33 -2128.95 -2148.01 -2146.36 -2139.02 -2171.52 -2159.73 -2143.87 -2141.33
5.FR.DAYS -2125.11 -2190.42 -2190.39 -2175.33 -2216.98 -2190.76 -2156.95 -2179.35 -2158.49 -2166.88 -2129.18 -2148.01 -2140.18 -2130.77 -2171.52 -2162.92 -2158.24 -2133.74
PROT.65 -2161.39 -2175.44 -2186.78 -2173.79 -2193.22 -2173.97 -2163.78 -2173.74 -2175.26 -2163.74 -2173.76 -2174.14 -2178.93 -2178.94 -2182.20 -2197.74 -2175.15 -2168.22
CAT.65 -2120.41 -2136.94 -2218.46 -2187.61 -2212.88 -2179.11 -2140.22 -2171.70 -2189.82 -2174.68 -2154.27 -2132.33 -2162.48 -2170.95 -2185.29 -2139.66 -2166.07 -2128.66
ISLAM.65 -2101.56 -2155.84 -2185.44 -2156.55 -2198.04 -2147.90 -2131.46 -2144.13 -2188.00 -2152.03 -2144.24 -2117.48 -2167.13 -2178.62 -2175.15 -2161.23 -2117.23 -2111.26
ANI.65 -2097.91 -2111.74 -2184.55 -2174.81 -2210.99 -2151.49 -2114.23 -2149.27 -2146.09 -2146.32 -2120.07 -2111.33 -2145.24 -2125.82 -2168.22 -2136.43 -2117.90 -2100.51
Table 8: Bayesian model posterior probability of the best model for each possible couple of deep determinants referred to the only best models
for each couple of deep determinants.
1st/2nd None GDPpw.60 PRI.60 SEC.60 LE.60 DEM.60.65 CON.60.65 ELF.61 ABS.LAT ME TROP.AR LND100CR AR.FROST 5.FR.DAYS PROT.65 CAT.65 ISLAM.65 ANI.65
GDPpw.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PRI.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SEC.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LE.60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.000 0.000
DEM.60.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CON.60.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ELF.61 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ABS.LAT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ME 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TROP.AR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LND100CR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR.FR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.FR.DAYS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PROT.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CAT.65 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ISLAM.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ANI.65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Regime H Regime LH Regime LL
Australia Algeria China
Austria Argentina Egypt
Belgium Benin Gambia, The
Canada Bolivia Greece
Cyprus Brazil India
Denmark Burundi Indonesia
Finland Cameroon Iran
France Central African Republic Japan
Ireland Chile Jordan
Israel Colombia Korea, Republic of
Italy Congo, Democratic Republic Malaysia
Luxembourg Congo, Republic of Mali
Netherlands Costa Rica Mauritania
New Zealand Cote d’Ivoire Nepal
Norway Dominican Republic Niger
Spain Ecuador Thailand
Sweden El Salvador Turkey
Switzerland Gabon
United Kingdom Ghana
United States of America Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Kenya
Malawi
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Singapore
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Uganda
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
Table 9: Lists of countries in the three growth regimes for the best model
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Regime H
Dep. Var: log.n log.i/y log.h
Pooled GAM Pooled GAM Pooled GAM
1960-2008 1960-2008 1960-2008
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept -2.671*** -1.451*** 2.019***
D1970−1980 -0.061 0.0432 0.104***
D1980−1990 -0.101** -0.036 0.184***
D1990−2000 -0.182*** -0.006 0.239***
D2000−2008 -0.185** 0.067 0.278***
Semi-parametric coefficients: EDF EDF EDF
log.y 1.000*** 2.241** 1.000***
log.n.1960 2.858 3.019** 3.548***
log.i/y.1960 7.833*** 4.885*** 1.000
log.h.1960 1.000 1.000 1.000***
REML score -45.784 -40.97 -85.68
Scale est. 0.011 0.014 0.006
Obs. 100 100 100
Countries. 20 20 20
Table 10: First-stage regressions of potentially endogenous determinants. Significance codes: 0.01”***”
0.05”**” 0.1”*”. EDF: estimated degrees of freedom that reflect the flexibility of the model (when the EDFs
of a term are equal to one, the smooth term can be substituted by a linear function). REML score: score of
the restricted maximum likelihood estimation providing the fundamental information on the specification of the
model. Scale est.: scale parameter, corresponding to the residual variance of the estimation. Obs.: number
of observations. Countries: number of countries.
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Regime LH
Dep. Var: log.n log.i/y log.h
Pooled GAM Pooled GAM Pooled GAM
1960-2008 1960-2008 1960-2008
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept -2.625*** -1.692*** 0.798***
D1970−1980 0.051** 0.193*** 0.350***
D1980−1990 0.064*** 0.068 0.663***
D1990−2000 0.067*** -0.035 0.877***
D2000−2008 0.009 0.039 1.019***
Semi-parametric coefficients: EDF EDF EDF
log.y 1.000* 1.000 3.192**
log.n.1960 3.725*** 3.053** 1.147
log.i/y.1960 1.000 4.020*** 4.163***
log.h.1960 3.930*** 1.000 1.631***
Gen. R2 0.42 0.56 0.89
REML score -158.53 65.823 -8.135
Scale est. 0.011 0.084 0.004
Obs. 235 235 235
Countries. 47 47 47
Table 11: First-stage regressions of potentially endogenous determinants. Significance codes: 0.01”***”
0.05”**” 0.1”*”. EDF: estimated degrees of freedom that reflect the flexibility of the model (when the EDFs
of a term are equal to one, the smooth term can be substituted by a linear function). REML score: score of
the restricted maximum likelihood estimation providing the fundamental information on the specification of the
model. Scale est.: scale parameter, corresponding to the residual variance of the estimation. Obs.: number
of observations. Countries: number of countries.
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Regime LL
Dep. Var: log.n log.i/y log.h
Pooled GAM Pooled GAM Pooled GAM
1960-2008 1960-2008 1960-2008
Parametric coefficients: Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept -2.699*** -1.877*** 0.440***
D1970−1980 0.056 0.363*** 0.399***
D1980−1990 0.131*** 0.429*** 0.796***
D1990−2000 0.109*** 0.416*** 1.074***
D2000−2008 0.055 0.488*** 1.306***
Semi-parametric coefficients: EDF EDF EDF
log.y 1.000* 1.000 4.414**
log.n.1960 2.104*** 3.053** 2.725
log.i/y.1960 2.115*** 4.020*** 1.000
log.h.1960 3.348*** 1.000 6.312***
REML score -37.85 30.175 24.739
Scale est. 0.014 0.076 0.050
Obs. 85 85 85
Countries. 17 17 17
Table 12: First-stage regressions of potentially endogenous determinants. Significance codes: 0.01”***”
0.05”**” 0.1”*”. EDF: estimated degrees of freedom that reflect the flexibility of the model (when the EDFs
of a term are equal to one, the smooth term can be substituted by a linear function). REML score: score of
the restricted maximum likelihood estimation providing the fundamental information on the specification of the
model. Scale est.: scale parameter, corresponding to the residual variance of the estimation. Obs.: number
of observations. Countries: number of countries.
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